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ABSTRACT M°^ CA 939^ 01
This thesis analyzes the history of Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation. The
"special" Moscow-New Delhi relationship during the Cold War, the thesis concludes,
was based upon Indian needs, American ambivalence and Soviet opportunism. In the
post-Cold War era this relationship has persisted due to continued American
ambivalence, short-term Indian military needs, and Russian economic needs. This bond,
therefore, may be fractured by an eventual improvement in Indian military self-reliance or
a deepening in Indo-American military cooperation. India's strategic culture, rooted in
Indian history, geography and political culture, has created an Indian strategic mindset
impervious to American nonproliferation efforts. This thesis finds, moreover, that there
are no short-term "silver bullets" to cure the current Indo-American rift, which flows
from causes in addition to India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. While short-term
measures can be taken to improve the bilateral relationship, the historical rift that has
emerged between the two states cannot be easily mended. The United States, therefore,
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a strategic goal of the United States, rooted in the strategic self-
interest of the United States, to see a secure India; a more economically
vibrant India; and, of course, a better relationship between India and the
United States. The nuclear issue is a complicating factor but not
necessarily a contradictory one (and I insist on that distinction).
-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott 1
On 17 August 1999, India's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) released a
draft copy of its long awaited nuclear doctrine.2 Arriving fifteen months after the May
1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, 3 the draft document refueled the debate within the United
States over the future course of American policy towards India. But while the U.S. State
Department was warning, "We think it would be unwise [for India] to move in the
direction of developing a nuclear deterrent" due to the potential "action-reaction cycle"
1 Strobe Talbott, address at the India International Center, New Delhi, India, 30 January
1999. Available online: <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_Remarks/1999/990130_
talbott_india.html> [25 July 1999].
2
"India Spells Out Draft N-doctrine." The Hindustan Times (18 August 1999).
Available online:<http:www.hindustantimes.com> [19 August 1999]. "India Reserves
Right To Retaliatory N-strikes." The Times ofIndia (18 August 1999). Available online:
<http://www.timesofindia.com > [19 August 1999].
3 Pokhran II is the name normally attributed to the testing of three nuclear weapons by
India on 11 May 1998 at the Pokhran test range in India's Rajasthan desert. Pokhran I
was the execution of a single Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) by India on 1 4 May
1974. The Pokhran IE tests followed Pokhran II by two days and encompassed the testing
of two additional nuclear weapons. In the months leading up to the execution of Pokhran
II, the overall series of tests were code named "Operation Shakti." The word Shakti
translates into "strength" or "power."
for a South Asian arms race,4 the Russian response was diametric. Rather than aligning
Russia's reaction with that of the other global powers, Grigory Karasin, the Russian
Deputy Minister in charge of relations with India, stated, "We shall carefully study this
draft and in due time clearly state our opinion."5 More telling is the fact that as the
Clinton Administration pushed for a continuation of sanctions against India,6 Russia was
negotiating with India for the sale of TU-22 BM strike-bombers. 7 This contrast in
American and Russian approaches to Indian "security needs," and the legacy created by
these polar approaches, typifies Indo-Russian and Indo-American relationships over the
last five decades and is the focus of this thesis.
Moreover, this thesis analyses the proposition that the history of Indian
procurement of Soviet/Russian military hardware provides a framework for
understanding Indian strategic culture and its influence on past, present and future
development of military and nuclear forces. Intertwined in the history of Indo-Russian
military cooperation, one can also find the roots of the Indo-American diplomatic divide
4 Barry Bearak, "An Indian Call for a Nuclear Arsenal." The New York Times (22 August
1999): A16.
5 Vladimit Radyuhin, "Russia Refuses to Join India Bashing." The Hindu (22 August
1999). Available online: <http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1999/08/22/stories/
0322000 l.htm> [22 August 1999].
6
"N-doctrine Invites G-8 Wrath, Sanctions to Stay." The Times of India (20 August
1999). Available online: <http://www.timesofindia.com/200899/20homel.htm> [20
August 1999].
7
"Russia May Sell Four Bombers To India," The Economic Times Online (28 August
1999).
that continues to separate the world's two largest democracies. This divide, and the
numerous factors that may prevent it from being completely bridged, is also discussed in
this thesis.
Finally, this thesis examines the implications of the fact that India does not pose a
direct military threat to the United States homeland. Any possibility for future strife
between these two states, while remote, would most likely emerge from an area denial
scenario in which the United States attempted to project military power into the Asian
subcontinent or its surrounding waters. In this aspect, any possibility for military conflict
between India and the United States would be, from an Indian perspective, the product of
American aggression and Indian defense.
When the draft nuclear doctrine was released in August 1999, American policy
goals in South Asia consisted of five short-term "steps" and one long-term goal. The
short-term steps entailed: the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT); a cessation of the production of fissile material by both states; a
limitation on the development and deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear capable
aircraft; tightening the export controls in both India and Pakistan for nuclear technology;
and the expansion of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan.
The long-term objective of American policy in South Asia was "universal adherence to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."8 To promote these "steps" and the end-state goal,
8 Strobe Talbott, "U.S. Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report" (speech delivered
at The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 12 November 1998). Available online:
<http://www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/19981112a.htm> [25 July 1999].
the United States utilized a broad application of economic sanctions. American policy in
South Asia during the fifteen months following Pokhran II can therefore be viewed as
strictly nuclear-centric. Choosing a dialogue based on nonproliferation, the United States
was certain to meet with eventual failure. As a proud nation and emerging power, India
would not allow a foreign power, especially the United States, to dictate "internal"
decisions, particularly with regard to national security and international status.
Contrary to America's nuclear-focused approach to India, Russia adopted a more
balanced approach to India in the period following Pokhran II. While the reaction of
Russia's political leadership to India's proliferation was mixed, the signing of a ten-year
treaty of military and technological cooperation in December 1 998 sent a clear signal that
Russia would neither condemn India nor would it support American nonproliferation
efforts in South Asia. Claiming that it would continue to honor the historically "special"
relationship, Russia would solidify the Indo-Russian military bond during this period.
The crux of the "Indian problem" for American policy makers, therefore, is
twofold. The first issue is the need to realize that India is not a problem. India is not a
rogue state. Having based its post-Cold War policy objectives in India on the issue of
nonproliferation, the United States allowed no flexibility in the Indo-American dialogue.
While the Indian decision to overtly weaponize its nuclear program may have been a slap
in the face of American preferences, the catalysts for the tests ran much deeper than
simple anti-American sentiments. There is a need, therefore, for American policy-makers
to understand the role of Indian strategic culture as the medium through which Indian
4
military and nuclear procurement decisions are made. An underlying theme of this thesis,
therefore, is to draw out the essence of India's strategic culture and to demonstrate how
Russia has historically catered to this aspect of Indian thought while America has
remained impervious to its influence.
As defined by Ken Booth, strategic culture is the product of a nation's "history,
geography and political culture," and it helps to "shape behavior on such issues as the use
of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations
and strategic doctrine."9 As shown below, the value of this definition when applied to an
analysis of India's nuclear weapons program is that it embraces three core theoretical
models normally attributed to nuclear proliferation: the "security," "domestic politics"
and "norms" models. 10
From an American policy perspective, an understanding of Indian nuclear
proliferation must embrace a broad spectrum of proliferation incentives and the reality
that "security," "domestic politics," and perceived international "norms" have all been
instrumental at various times during the evolution of India's nuclear weapons program.
9 Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed.,
Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990), 121.
10 The security model claims that "states build nuclear weapons to increase national
security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats." The domestic politics model
"envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and
bureaucratic interests." The norms model highlights the acquisition or restraint from
acquisition of nuclear weapons as a "symbol of a state's modernity and identity." See
Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" International Security 21, no.
3 (Winter 1996/97), 55.
As the status of India in the international arena has changed, Indian perceptions of
international "norms" have also changed. Changes in India's domestic politics have
sharply changed the role and influence of nuclear weapons as a symbol of national self-
esteem and power. Furthermore, changes in the military and nuclear capabilities of
Pakistan and China have reduced the geographic security of India and have provided
nuclear proponents a rhetorical foundation, if not a fully credible military-technical
foundation, for pursuing nuclear security. While the confines of this thesis do not allow a
detailed discussion of Indian strategic culture, 11 critical junctures in Indian history,
geographic security and political culture that influenced the evolution of India's nuclear
program are highlighted below.
The second aspect of the American approach to the "Indian problem" is a failure
to understand the dynamics of the "special" Indo-Russian relationship. The continued
references by Indian and Russian officials to the unique quality of their bipolar relations
imply a certain resilience and common perspective in Indian and Russian strategic,
diplomatic and economic interests. This thesis argues, however, that the Indo-Russian
relationship is not "special" when placed in a vacuum, devoid of outside influences.
While India and Russia have had, and will continue to have, common interests that are
necessary for the development of a resilient bond, said commonality has not been in and
11 For a discussion of India's strategic culture, see George Tanham, "Indian Strategic
Culture," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter 1992), and Jerry Conley, "Indian
Strategic Culture: A Past, Present and Future Analysis," unpublished paper, The Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (19 March 1999).
of itself sufficient to solidify their relationship. The glue in the Indo-Soviet/Russian
"special" relationship, therefore, has been and continues to be American ambivalence
towards India and Indian military needs. If American ambivalence dissipates and India's
military-industrial complex achieves a high-level of self-reliance, the Indo-Russian bond
will fragment.*&*
Chapter II of this thesis presents an historical overview of India's Cold War
military procurement decisions. Central to this period was an Indian desire for diplomatic
independence and military self-reliance. Indeed, the Cold War Indo-Soviet relationship
was created by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism and American ambivalence. While not
intended as a critique of American Cold War policies in South Asia, Chapter II highlights
the pivotal decisions made by the United States in South Asia, explains the short-term
consequences of said decisions upon Indian military procurement, and shows how a
legacy of mistrust and suspicion was created towards the United States. This legacy
continues to influence Indo-American and Indo-Russian relations today.
Chapter HI encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War up through the
Pokhran tests of 1998. This period is defined by a shift in Indo-Russian relations as
Russian economic needs became a dominating factor for continued military cooperation
with India. While an Indian attempt to severe the umbilical cord to the Russian military-
industrial complex would fall short, India would take advantage of Russian cooperation
to expand its military base. Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on
nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of Indo-American relations. This
period represents an opportunity lost for American security interests in South Asia as
Russian influence was allowed to remain and American influence was not properly
developed.
The final chapter of this thesis examines Indo-Russian and Indo-American
relations in the post-Pokhran II era. The legacy of the Cold War will continue to
influence bilateral interactions. Additionally, the ability of the United States to influence
Indian nuclear expansion will be limited. With Russian assistance, India will pursue a
nuclear triad and develop its "minimal" nuclear deterrent. The primary option available
to the United States, therefore, will be to endeavor to ensure that Indian nuclear
expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe, and limited manner, and to promote an
improvement and redefining of the Indo-American dialogue. The future policy options of
the United States will be weighed against Indian economic, political and military needs,
American strategic interests, and Russian influence. While no "silver bullet" for Indo-
American bilateral bliss is evident, the need and the means to improve a teetering
strategic situation are elucidated. This thesis concludes that India does matter to future
American security interests, and that future American policy must be scripted
accordingly.
II. THE COLD WAR YEARS: 1947-1991
The real reason why there is now an increasingly open conflict between
Western and Indian policy and attitudes on so many issues is, quite simply,
almost tautologically, that the West and India are running an increasing
risk of pursuing policies which cut severely across each other's interests.
The Russians have done no more than act as a catalyst....The real symbol
of what has happened is not the welcoming millions who cheered Messrs.
Bulganin and Khruschchev in Calcutta, but the grim sharpness of the
reaction which met Mr. Dulles's description of Goa as a "Province of
Portugal." 12
-The Round Table, 1956
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Indo-Soviet and Indo-American
diplomatic, economic and military relations during the Cold War years from 1947 to
1991. This analysis highlights an historical pattern in the Indo-Soviet relationship that
supported India's quest for regional security and independent global stature and an
oscillating Soviet vision of India based upon India's changing geo-strategic and
diplomatic significance. This chapter argues that, far from being an enduring and close
"special relationship," 13 the historical foundations of the Indo-Soviet relationship reveal
an opportunistic relationship in which "India's needs are a match for Soviet capabilities,
and Soviet needs are a match for India's strengths." 14 Moreover, the strength of the Indo-
12
"Tovarishchi Errant," The Round Table, no. 182 (March 1956): 117.
13 The term "special relationship" has often used by Indian and Russian officials to
describe the Indo-Soviet/Russian bond. The implication of this term is that the bilateral
ties go beyond Indian and Russian self-serving interests and serve a greater good. This
chapter will argue otherwise.
14 Peter Zwick, Soviet Foreign Relations: Process and Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990), 317.
Soviet relationship depended upon the short-term impact of Indo-American interactions.
Additionally, this chapter highlights major South Asian policy decisions made by the
United States during the Cold War and shows that the cementing of the "special" Indo-
Soviet relationship was a product of American inattention as much as Soviet
perseverance.
A. 1947-50: DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMICS
During the early years of Indian independence, the focus of Soviet and American
foreign policies was the shoring-up of Western and Soviet areas of influence in Europe
and Eastern Asia. From the Soviet perspective, India and Pakistan remained "satellites of
British imperialism with no real capacity for independent action." 15 It was the personal
opinion of Stalin that India's leadership and the dominant Congress Party were
"bourgeoisie." According to one Indian scholar, Stalin believed that "India under the rule
of the bourgeoisie was as good as India under British rule." 16 American policy-makers
tended to view India through the prism of British foreign policies. More concerned about
strong Anglo-American ties than Indo-American ties, the United States was willing to
align itself with British policies concerning Kashmir. While both the Soviet Union and
the United States would initiate economic agreements with India during this period, the
Euro-centric focus of the emerging Cold War opponents would marginalize India.
15
"India and Pakistan Through Russian Eyes," British Survey Main Series (April 1958):
15.
16 J. A. Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev (Delhi: Vikas
Publications, 1970), 190.
10
1. Early Indo-American Military Ties
During the pivotal years of 1951-54, the United States made foreign policy
decisions that would initiate a diplomatic divide with India. In 1951, India signed a
reimbursable military aid agreement with the United States that totaled $38 million by
1957. 17 Included in this package was the 1952 sale of two hundred World War H-era
Sherman tanks for $19 million. 18 The American willingness to sell military hardware to
India was not limitless, however, and a simultaneous request to purchase two hundred
military jets, valued at $150 million, was denied by President Truman. American
lawmakers had found it difficult to rationalize a $150 million military aid package to a
country that had just been granted $190 million in food aid the previous year. 19 Instead,
the U.S. Congress and State Department authorized a less expensive package of fifty-four
C-119 transports. These initial Indo-American military transactions highlight the
willingness of India's leadership in the early 1950's to expand the existing Indo-
American economic relationship into the realm of military cooperation.20 The American
17
"Outline Plan of Operations With Respect to India and Nepal," Operations
Coordination Board, Washington, D.C. (27 February 1957): 7. Digital National Security
Archives, Nonproliferation Collection. Item number: NP00290.
18 Dennis Kux, 86.
19 Ibid.
20 Nehru's willingness to ask the United States for arms may also have been fueled by his
depreciated opinion of the Soviet Union. This was brought about by the adverse
treatment of his sister during her tenure as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and attempts
by the Indian Communist Party to overthrow the government. "India: Problems and
Perspectives," OIR Report No. 5052 (Secret), U.S. Department of State (04 October
1949): 42.
11
decision to prevent any deepening in military assistance to India in 1952 marked a first
step to future Indo-Soviet military cooperation.
2. U.S. Arms to Pakistan
On 24 February 1954, U.S. Ambassador George Allen informed Prime Minister
Nehru of the American decision to supply arms to Pakistan.21 President Eisenhower sent
Nehru a letter in which he promised that Pakistan would not use the American-supplied
weapons against India.22 Eisenhower also extended an offer to sell the same type of
armaments to India.23 Although India's leadership believed that American interests in
Pakistan centered on an American desire for basing rights in Kashmir,24 an American-
21 The United States sold Pakistan F-104 Starfighters and F-86 Sabres which were
superior to any aircraft in the Indian inventory. S. Nihal Singh, 71 1. Moreover, the F-
104 was the same aircraft requested by and denied to India two years earlier. From 1954
to 1965, "Pakistan received over $630 million in grant military assistance for weapons,
$619 million for defense support assistance, and some $55 million worth of equipment
purchased on a cash or concessional basis. In the same period, India purchased over $50
million in military equipment." See Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia:
A Policy Analysis," Pacific Affairs 49, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 50.
22 This promise was broken in both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars. See Raju G.
Thomas, "U.S. Transfers of 'Dual-Use' Technologies to India," Asian Survey 30, no. 9
(September 1990): 838.
23 Bimal Prasad, 56. Sumit Ganguly, presentation at conference titled, "Influencing the
Motivations of WMD States: New Directions in Nonproliferation and
Counterproliferation," held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (19 August
1999).
24
"Indian Countermeasures to US Military Aid to Pakistan," Report No. 6885, Division
of Research for Near East, South Asia and Africa, U.S. Department of State (7 April
1955): 1. "India's Political and Economic Position in the East-West Conflict," OIR
Report No. 5526 (Secret). U.S. Department of State (15 May 1951): 8.
12
Pakistani agreement to base American spy planes and electronic intelligence equipment at
Peshawar Airbase in Kashmir was not made until 1959. 25
"The basic idea [of selling arms to Pakistan] remained one of providing
greater stability to the northern tier region through association with the
United States, making it easier for these countries to deal with the
presumed Communist threat. Because Washington saw this danger more
as political and psychological than military, the Defense Department
played almost no role in the decision-making process."26
From the American viewpoint, the decision to arm Pakistan was based on the need
to contain Communist expansion and was not meant to be anti-Indian in nature.27
Though the United States rejected the Indian claim that Pakistan would turn the American
25 In a Top Secret analysis of the possible repercussions of U.S. military aid to Pakistan,
conducted one month prior to the official announcement, the first two "assumptions" of
the analysis were that the program would be "of modest proportions" and "would not
involve establishment of US military bases or a formal US-Pakistani mutual assistance
commitment." This analysis was performed by the Central Intelligence Agency, which
would oversee the U-2 spy plane program. See "The Probable Repercussions of a US
Decision to Grant or Deny Military Aid to Pakistan," Central Intelligence Agency Special
Estimate (15 January 1954): 1. Declassified: 9 September 1992. Former U.S.
Ambassador to India Dennis Kux writes that in early 1959, "Pakistan agreed to provide
the United States facilities for sensitive US intelligence operations near the city of
Peshawar." See Dennis Kux, 160.
26 Dennis Kux, 110. While the strategic advantage of U.S. basing rights in Pakistan
would not emerge until five years later, it has been argued that another catalyst to the
American decision was "a wish to give vent to anti-Indian feelings." See Dennis Kux,
115.
27 It has also been argued, however, that Vice President Richard Nixon and Senate
Majority Leader William Knowland were interested in arming Pakistan as a
"counterweight to India." Dennis Kux, 110.
13
arms against India, subsequent reports show that U.S. diplomats were in fact aware of
these Pakistani intentions.28
Nehru's response to Eisenhower's letter was immediate. He rejected the
American offer for military hardware29 and condemned the American decision as an
impetus for further destabilization in Kashmir. 30 Nehru also stated that U.S. personnel
stationed in Kashmir as part of the UN observer force could no longer be viewed as
neutrals. 31
The American decision to supply military hardware to Pakistan in 1954 is often
cited as one of the defining moments in Indo-American relations. By placing American
geo-strategic concerns above the regional security concerns of India, the United States
28 Immediately after receiving Eisenhower's letter, Nehru addressed the Indian
Parliament and cited Pakistani Prime Minister Ali's claim that the Kashmir problem
would be solved by the purchase of American arms. See "Indian Countermeasures to US
Military Aid to Pakistan," 1. Hemen Ray, Indo-Soviet Relation: 1955-1971 (Bombay:
Jaico Publishing House, 1973): 180. Ray cites testimony by former U.S. Ambassador to
India Chester Bowles given before the joint committee of the U.S. Congress in which
Bowles states, "from the outset the Pakistani government had made it clear that it had no
quarrel either with the USSR or China and privately admitted that its military build up
was in fact directed against India." From the Indian perspective, the fact that this
testimony was given on 21 January 1971, at the beginning of a pivotal year in Indo-
American relations, is probably as critical as the actual content of the testimony. See the
"1971" subsection below.
29
"Outline Plan of Operations With Respect to India and Nepal," 7. Sumit Ganguly,
conference presentation at NPS.
30
"Indian Countermeasures to US Military Aid to Pakistan," 1-2.
31 Ibid.
14
interfered "with the balance of things in India and Asia."32 While American policy-
makers may well have known about and understood Pakistan's intentions in procuring
American weaponry, there appears to be no doubt that the United States vastly
underestimated the long-term damage that the 1954 arms agreement would have on Indo-
American relations. As an editorial in the British Commonwealth magazine, The Round
Table, observed in 1956, "Indians inevitably, and increasingly, regard all military aid
given to Pakistan as a hostile act against themselves, an act which, they fear, may drive
them in turn into increasing their own armed forces. . .[T]hey fear that the need to get the
most modern equipment to match what Pakistan is getting may drive them either into
political dependence upon a Western supplier, or into taking arms from the very ready
Russians."33 The sale of American arms to Pakistan would validate Nehru's long-held
suspicions of American motives and provide the initial opening for an eventual influx of
Soviet military assistance to India.
B. SOVIET OPPORTUNISM AND WEAPONRY: 1954-62
The rise of Indian diplomatic strength in the early 1950's and the death of Joseph
Stalin in March 1953 paved the way for a revision of Soviet policy in South Asia.
Additionally, the formation of cracks in the Sino-Soviet relationship provided for "two
pillars of common interest" between India and the Soviet Union. These pillars were the
need to counter-balance growing Chinese influence and the desire to reduce the Western




presence in South Asia. 34 The period 1954 to 1962 would usher in a surge in Indo-Soviet
military and diplomatic cooperation and widen the gap in Indo-American relations.
1. Nikita Khrushchev
Under the guidance of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet foreign policy towards the Third
World would make a dramatic turn. Understanding the diplomatic importance of the
Non-Aligned Movement35 and seeing the strategic vulnerability created in the Soviet
Union's periphery by Stalin's "passive neglect,"36 Khrushchev guided a new Soviet
perspective of the Third World that resulted in a philosophy of "optimistic activism."37
The timing of Khrushchev's rise to power coincided with American arms shipments to
Pakistan and the emergence of a Chinese threat to India.38 Able to exploit the Indian fear
34 Peter Zwick, 317. Anita Inder Singh, "A New Indo-Russian Connection,"
International Affairs 71, no. 1 (January 1995): 70.
35 J. A.Naik, 191.
36 Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Policies Toward the Developing World During the 1980s: The
Dilemmas of Power and Presence (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press,
December 1986): 8-9.
37 The fact that Khrushchev did not hold the same animosity towards "national
bourgeoisie" as Stalin, and that he had a personal fascination with Third World countries
and their leadership, may have also been contributing factors to this policy change. See
Daniel S. Papp, 8, and Peter Zwick, 287.
38 In 1954, India and China adopted a relationship based on the "Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence." These principles, called Panch Sheela in Hindi, emphasized:
mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-
aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual
benefits; and co-existence. See John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations:
Hostile Co-Existence (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc: 1967), 85-
86; and "Indians to Arms," The Economist (8 June 1963): 993. While Nehru would cling
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of an American-Pakistani military relationship39 while also experiencing a divergence
with China over the role of China in the global Communist movement,40 Khrushchev saw
the value of a strong Indo-Soviet partnership and acted accordingly.41 Beginning with the
Khrushchev era, Table 2.1, highlights thirty-three years of Soviet economic aid to India.
The first transfer of Soviet military hardware to India took place in 1955 with the
sale of two 11-14 transport aircraft.42 While Khrushchev appeared extremely eager to
engage India in 1955, Nehru was much more cautious in guiding India's first steps
towards Indo-Soviet military cooperation. Nehru's primary concern was still the
economic health of his country and not its military might. Accordingly, he found in
to this vision of a peaceful Indo-Chinese relationship, a series of armed Chinese
incursions into Northern India in 1959 would shatter this hope.
39 HemenRay, 180.
40 Robbin F. Laird, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy (Montpelier, VT: Capital City Press, 1987):
22.
41 During a speech in Srinagar in 1955, Khrushchev stated that "Kashmir was an integral
part of India," and set the stage for over one hundred Soviet vetoes of United Nations
resolutions concerning Kashmir. Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking,''
Strategic Analysis 21, no. 10 (January 1998): 1470. Available online: <http://www.idsa-
india.org/an-jan-6.html>. Cited in Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United
States: Breaking with the Past (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1 997),
32.
42 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," Asian Survey 19, no. 3 (March
1979): 232.
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Khrushchev's "optimistic activism" and America's willingness to continue Indo-







Recipient % Recipient %






Afghanistan 10 India 21 India 11 Nicaragua 14
Turkey 8 Afghanistan 14 Morocco 10 Afghanistan 12
Iraq 7 Algeria 6 Afghanistan 10 South Yemen 5
Morocco 5 Iraq 5 Nigeria 6 Algeria 4




Syria 5 Ethiopia 3 Pakistan 4 Egypt 3
Egypt 4 , Algeria 4
Nicaragua 4 Syria 3




Total: 80 78 67 93
Source: Peter Zwick, Soviet Foreign Relations: Process and Policy (Enelewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990): 295, Table 9-1.
* This table denotes countries that received at least three percent ofthe total Soviet
economic aid during the given period.
Table 2.1: Soviet Economic Aid to Noncommunist Less-developed Countries, 1954
to 1987 and by Regimes*( million $ U.S.)
Indian economic growth. While the Soviet Union provided economic assistance to
India's industrial base, the United States continued to support Indian agriculture and
infrastructure development.
43 From 1955 to 1965, India was the largest recipient of American economic aid. Raju G.
C. Thomas, 838.
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From 1955 to 1960, several events validated Nehru's cautious approach to Indo-
Soviet and Indo-American relations. The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 severely
tainted the Indian image of Khrushchev's Soviet Union.44 Although Nehru criticized the
invasion privately,45 India did not condemn the Soviet aggression during a United
Nations vote.46 India also declined to support the Soviet initiative for a troika governing
body in the United Nations,47 the Soviet plan for a unified Germany,48 and the aggressive
Soviet stance during the Suez Crisis.49 The following year, however, the Soviet Union
supported India diplomatically by vetoing a resolution in the United Nations concerning
the placement of an armed United Nations force in Kashmir.50 Three years later the
Soviets blocked a UN resolution condemning the Indian invasion of Goa.51 From an
44
"The Prospects for India Over the Next Few Years," OIR Report No. 8342, U.S.
Department of State (12 September 1960). [SECRET/NOFORN] Declassified 23
February 1978. "Asian Reaction to Events in Hungary," Office of Current Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency (5 November 1956). Declassified: September 1997.
45
"Asian Reaction to Events in Hungary." Top Secret Memorandum, Central Intelligence
Agency Office of Current Intelligence (5 November 1956). Declassifed: September 1997.
Available online: http://www.foia.ucia.gov. Bimal Prasad, 101-2.




50 Bimal Prasad, 141. J. A. Naik, 123.
51 Hemen Ray, 183; P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 233; S. Nihal
Singh, "Why India Goes to Moscow For Arms," Asian Survey 24, no. 7 (July 1984): 711.
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Indian perspective, therefore, the ability to draw upon Soviet diplomatic support, without
forfeiting Indian neutrality, became a diplomatic balancing act for Nehru.
2. India's Quest for Weaponry: 1959-62
From 1947 to 1962, Prime Minister Nehru focused India's foreign policies around
the Non-Aligned Movement and India's economic development. According to S. Nihal
Singh, "The pacifism and non-alignment of Jawaharlal Nehru, the builder of modern
India and its prime minister for seventeen years, meant that the modernization and
strengthening of the armed forces was a low priority....Nehru was loath to pour money
into modernizing the armed forces at the cost of economic development."52 Extremely
sensitive to becoming dependent on foreign suppliers, India obtained "licenses to
manufacture a wide range of defense items... including Gnat interceptors (U.K.), HS-748
transport aircraft (U.K.), Allouette helicopters (France), L-70 anti-aircraft guns (Sweden),
Vijayanta tanks (U.K.), Brandt mortars (France), and 106mm recoilless guns (U.S.)."53
What little foreign procurement India did pursue during the first fifteen years of
independence came mostly from Western suppliers. Table 2.2 below represents India's
importation of major weapons systems from 1947 to 1962.
52 S. Nihal Singh, 710.
53 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 231,
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Type Number Supplier
Sherman tank 1 80 Great Britain





Cruiser 2 Great Britain
R/Hunter-cIass destroyer 6 Great Britain
Frigates 8 Great Britain
Vampire aircraft 230 India (British license)
Ouragon aircraft 1 04 France
Hunter aircraft 182 Great Britain
Canberra aircraft 80 Great Britain
B-14 transport 26 Soviet Union
Mystere aircraft 1 1 France
Fairchild Packet aircraft 5 5 United States
An- 12 transport 16 Soviet Union
Mi-4 helicopter 26 Soviet Union
Source: P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation:
no. 3 (March 1979): 231-2.
A Review," Asian Survey 19,
Table 2.2: Indian Foreign Procurement of Weaponry, 1947-62
Nehru's ability to neglect his armed forces came to an abrupt halt with a series of
Chinese military incursions into India during October 1959.54 The rugged and remote
nature of the Himalayas meant that India had to rapidly expand its airborne resupply and
transport capabilities. Turning to the United States, Indian Defense Minister Krishna
54 Hemen Ray, 179; J. A. Naik, 148; and John Rowland, 1 17-30.
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Menon secured the purchase of twenty-nine Fairchild C-119 transport aircraft. 55 The
United States, however, would not expand this transaction to include the sale of
Sidewinder missiles,56 which would have given the Indian Air Force a decided edge over
a Chinese air force equipped with MiG-17s/19s. Among the factors which most likely
influenced Eisenhower's rejection of the Sidewinder deal were: an American view of a
"tough, virile Pakistan, coupled with a perception of an India on the verge of
fragmentation and disintegration;"57 the strategic importance of the now operational
Peshawar U-2 spy plane program in Pakistan; and an American diplomatic desire not to
reward Krishna Menon with advanced weaponry. 58 The United States may also have
been content to allow the Soviet Union to stabilize India against a Chinese threat.59
The Soviet response to the 1959 Chinese incursions into India, while rhetorically
cautious in nature, signaled clear support for India against Chinese aggression.
Diplomatically, the Soviet Union released a press statement, followed a month later by a
Khrushchev speech delivered at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet, expressing
55 Dennis Kux, 168-9. Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy
Analysis," 52, footnote 1 1
.
56 Dennis Kux, 168.
57 Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis," 57.
58 Dennis Kux, 168.
59 Richard L. Siegel, Evaluating the Result of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American
Efforts in India (Denver, CO: University of Denver Press, 1968): 3.
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"regret" over the hostilities between "fraternal" China and "friendly" India.60 By not
siding with "fraternal" China against a democratic India, Khrushchev was sending a clear
message of "neutral" diplomatic support to India.
Militarily, the Soviet Union responded with the sale of twenty-four 11-14
transports in 1960; ten Mi-4 helicopters, eight An- 12 transports and six jet engines for
India's indigenous HF-24 aircraft in 1961; and sixteen Mi-4s and eight An- 12s in 1962. 61
While all of these aircraft were to be given to India's "Border Roads Development Board
for communication purposes," their military airlift potential was self-evident.62
Additionally, "Indian Air Force officers were sent to the Soviet Union for training in the
operation and maintenance of Soviet aircraft," and "forty Soviet pilots, navigators and
ground crews came to India for training Indian crews."63 In a few short years, changes in
India's security environment had dictated the need to modernize a long-neglected Indian
military. Lacking the indigenous capability to produce major weapons systems, and
finding Western governments reluctant to sell their most modern hardware, India began to
60 J. A.Naik, 148-50.
61 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 232. The sale of six modified
MiG-19 engines in support of India's HF-24 project came about only after an earlier
contract to purchase British Bors-12 engines was cancelled when NATO withdrew its
commission for Bors-12 engines, thus forcing India to decide between fully funding the
project or shopping elsewhere. See Hemen Ray, 183. Eventually, however, India would
purchase Orpheus 703 engines from Britain for the HF-24. S. Nihal Singh, 707.
62 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 232.
63 The Hindu, 13 April 1962. Cited in Hemen Ray, 182, footnote 9.
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take longer strides towards military cooperation with the Soviet Union. The events of
1962 would force India one step closer to reliance on Soviet weaponry.
C. MiGs AND CHINESE AGGRESSION: 1962
As India began its quest for military modernization, the initial inclination of its
military and bureaucratic leadership was to look westwards. A large majority of India's
leadership had been educated in the West, and the military continued to maintain links
with Great Britain. Additionally, the preponderance of India's military hardware was of
Western origin, which meant that large scale procurement of Soviet hardware
"exacerbated problems of training, logistics, maintenance, and eventual absorption. In
the interim period the military effectiveness of the armed forces was impaired."64 The
reluctance of the United States to sell India one of its top-line military aircraft, and the
questionable quality of British and French weaponry, would lead India into a pivotal arms
deal with the Soviet Union that would be a precursor to India's eventual reliance on
Soviet arms. This choice was not the preferred option for India; it was "predicated by
dire necessity."65
1. The 1962 MiG Deal
When Nehru visited Moscow in 1955, Khrushchev extended an offer to sell India
60 to 100 MiG fighters. Fearful of becoming reliant on the Soviet Union for arms,66 and
64 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 234.
65 Ibid.
66 The New York Times (27 August 1955), cited in Hemen Ray, 180, footnote 1.
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more concerned over India's economic development, Nehru declined the Soviet offer.
The MiG offer would resurface again in 1961 when an Indian delegation was finalizing
the purchase of Soviet transport aircraft for the Himalayan operations.67 This time,
however, the offer was taken seriously as India's security environment had changed due
to the Chinese aggression in the north and Pakistan's recent receipt of F- 104 Starfighters
from the United States.68
While India explored the possibility of procuring Soviet MiGs, inquiries were
also made into the availability of purchasing American F-104s, British PI Lightnings and
French Mirage His. The Indian request for F-104s was flatly rejected by the United
States, however, due to the Pentagon's strategic interest in Pakistan.69 After exploring
the British and French options, Indian delegates ruled these aircraft out since neither
country was willing to grant India the licensing rights for indigenous production.70 It is
also believed that the United States, while unwilling to sell F- 1 04s directly to India, may
have conferred with Britain over the sale of the British Pis. 71 The end result of the
67 HemenRay, 182-83.
68 Dennis Kux, 168; P. R. Chari. "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 233; S. Nihal
Singh, 71 1; Hemen Ray, 184.
69 S. Nihal Singh, 711.
70 Hemen Ray, 183. The British, aware of the impending MiG deal, were especially
eager to secure an agreement with India in order to keep the British military pipeline open
to India. While the PI Lightning was offered at "one-half its market price," Britain
would not go the final step and offer a licensing agreement. See, P. R. Chari, "Indo-
Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 232; and S. Nihal Singh, 712.
71 S. Nihal Singh, 712; and P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 232.
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West's inability to meet India's immediate requirement to modernize its Air Force was
the signing of the historically significant MiG deal in the summer of 1962.
The terms of the MiG deal are worth noting because they highlight the difference
between the Soviet and Western approaches to military cooperation with India, and more
importantly, why the Soviet approach was more appealing to India. The initial agreement
was for the delivery of nineteen MiG-2 1 s and the establishment of indigenous production
facilities within India. 72 "Moscow seemed to be the only arms supplier sympathetic to
India's philosophy of a self-sufficient military establishment."73 Additionally, India
could pay in rupees or bartered goods74 and did not have to dip into its foreign reserves.
This part of the deal was crucial for India's continued economic development.
Furthermore, the outcry from Western leaders, such as John F. Kennedy and Harold
Macmillan, 75 over the sale of Soviet arms to India fostered a defiant and nationalistic
attitude in India. Nehru declared that "No independent country, certainly not India, can
agree to a proposition that our purchase of aircraft or anything can be vetoed by any other
country. We are not going to be influenced either by pressure or pressure tactics from
72 Bimal Prasad, 147; and Hemen Ray, 185. The initial contract, however, did not
provide for MiGs with all-weather and night fighting capabilities, which were crucial
from the Indian perspective for intercept operations along the Himalayan border. The
agreement was amended in 1964 to include these capabilities. See S. Nihal Singh, 712;
and Richard Siegel, 12.
73 S. Nihal Singh, 713.
74 Hemen Ray, 185.
75 Dennis Kux, 200-201; and S. Nihal Singh, 712.
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outside."76 Finally, the opening of an Indo-Soviet military relationship sent a clear signal
to China about the Soviet stance on South Asian affairs. 77 Underlining all of these
factors, however, was the Indian perspective that the MiG deal of 1 962 was a commercial
endeavor1^ (that is, a decision taken largely on financial grounds, with no political fealty
to the Soviet Union) undertaken to ensure the rapid modernization of a neglected Air
Force against a rising threat from the west and northeast. 79
2. Sino-Indian Conflict: 1962
The poor readiness of India's armed forces became apparent on 20 October 1962,
when "Chinese forces attacked Indian positions all along the northern borders and 'most
of the [Indian] troops deployed... [were] swept away like driftwood before a torrent.'"80
Fifteen years of neglect under the leadership of Nehru had left the Indian military
woefully unprepared to stop a large-scale invasion force. While the indicators of
impending Chinese aggression towards India had been present since the 1959 Tibetan
76 Jawaharlal Nehru in Indian Affairs Record, Vol. VE, No. 7, p. 172, cited in Hemen
Ray, 185.
77 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 234; and S. Nihal Singh, 712.
78 Hemen Ray, 179.
79 India's "commercial" perspective of the MiG deal is well underscored by the fact that
even two years after signing the MiG deal, India continued to pursue the purchase of F-
104s from the United States. Dennis Kux, 229-30; and P. R. Chari, 233. As discussed
above, the Soviet motivations for entering into the 1962 MiG deal were more geo-
strategic in nature and included the desire to offset growing American influence in
Pakistan and to support India against Chinese belligerence.
80 Apurba Kundu, Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), 136.
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uprisings, the short period of time available between 1959 and 1962 and India's limited
indigenous defense industry had not provided the cushion necessary to improve military
readiness.
India is desperately short of such conventional military hardware as
automatic rifles, artillery, trucks, ammunition and cargo planes. But it also
requires pilots, skilled maintenance men, a reliable military
communications network, a better intelligence system, totally revamped
supply methods and a modernized air force. 81
Adding to India's troubles was the fact that China's aggression was being played
out in the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis. With the two states most capable of
providing India with rapid military relief preoccupied by their own military confrontation,
India had to initially provide for its own defense. 82
The initial Soviet response to India's request for military assistance was to back-
step from its 1959 neutral stance on Sino-Indian hostilities and attempt to rally the
"socialist camp" in order to gain Chinese support during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 83 A
few days after the Chinese invasion, however, the Soviet Union renewed its neutral stance
with two editorials in Pravda, one on the 25 of October and one on the 5 th of
81 Igor Oganesoff, "Shaky India: Shortages of Weapons, Skills Will Keep Nation
Vulnerable a Long Time," The Wall Street Journal (30 November 1962): Al
.
82 In the months leading up to the 20 October invasion, India had indeed prepared for a
conflict with China by forward deploying its forces. Not only were these forces unable to
stop the rapid Chinese invasion, but their forward positioning has been cited as a possible
impetus for the Chinese aggression. See Apurba Kundu, 129-136. Some critics,
however, have also pointed to lackluster military leadership and poor operational
planning as the primary source of India's defeat. See Major Edgar O'Ballance, "India
Aims? Eastern World (October 1963): 12-14. Apurba Kundu, 144.
83 J. A. Naik, 154; Daniel S. Papp, 321; and Dennis Kux, 205.
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November. 84 Stating that the Soviet Union wanted "peace" between India and China,
these editorials, and subsequent promises for the delivery to New Delhi of more transport
aircraft and helicopters, showed that the Soviet Union was again willing to side with India
against China. 85
While the American response to India's request was more immediate than that of
the Soviet Union, the outlay of American military hardware still continued to be
measured. Following China's initial success, the United States provided C-130's, flown
by U.S. Air Force pilots, to ferry Indian troops up to bases in the Himalayas.
Additionally, American medical personnel, trained in cold weather medicine procedures,
were sent as advisors.86 But the rapid and decisive nature of the initial Chinese advance
into India made the effectiveness of American logistical support limited. 87 On 19
November, a month into the Chinese onslaught, Nehru wrote to President Kennedy
84 Bimal Prasad, 257. J. A. Naik, 154. Stephen P. Cohen, 52.
85 Ibid. HemenRay, 181.
86 Igor Oganesoff, A 1
.
87 While most scholars agree that the West responded quickly to India's initial request for
help, it has also been argued that the American Ambassador to India at the time, John
Galbraith, exacerbated the consequences of the initial Chinese invasion by convincing
Indian officials not to deploy the Indian Air Force in the Himalayas against China. Sumit
Ganguly, Naval Postgraduate School presentation, 19 August 1999. In his memoirs,
Ambassador Galbraith states that he "affirmed [his] intention to keep the Indians from
using their Air Force with the associated expectation of [American] support" because "we
learned in Korea that even with complete control of the air, we could not keep [the
Chinese] from supplying their forces or advancing." Galbraith 's primary concern was
that the deployment of the Indian Air Force would escalate tensions on the Sino-Indian
border. See John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador 's Journal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1969), 424.
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requesting that American fighter aircraft and air defense systems be provided to protect
India's cities and that B-47 bombers, flown by American pilots, strike Chinese positions
behind the front. 88 Two days later, before Kennedy had decided on a final response to
Nehru's request, the fighting had ended.89 The Chinese had "added the final humiliation
of declaring a unilateral cease-fire on all fronts and a withdrawal, to begin on 1
December, to positions behind the same line of actual control which Nehru refused to
accept earlier."90
In the immediate aftermath of India's defeat by China, many observers interpreted
India's need for rearmament and the initial willingness of the West to aid India as a
potential path to renewed Indian ties with the West.91 According to a report in The Wall
Street Journal, "In the event of a new Chinese offensive, the U.S. might be drawn into
assisting India in much the same way it is helping South Vietnam fight Communist
insurgents."92 Additionally, while the Soviet Union did not cancel the MiG deal made
ApurbaKundu, 141. Dennis Kux, 207.
89 It is of historical interest that in response to Nehru's 19 November request, Kennedy
had dispatched the U.S.S. Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal. The deployment of this same
aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal nine years later, during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War,
continues to be a point of contention between India and the United States. See Dennis
Kux, 207. Selig S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian
Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985):
20-21.
90 ApurbaKundu, 141.
91 Richard L. Siegel, Evaluating the Result of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American
Efforts in India, 9.
92 Igor Oganesoff, A 1
.
30
two months prior to the Chinese invasion, it did delay the delivery of the aircraft. This
"delay" has been attributed to several possible factors, including: Chinese pressure on the
Soviet Union,93 the possibility that "the Soviet Union was not fully committed to
transferring these warplanes" or the belief that the Soviet Union "may also have
entertained reservations about India's technological ability to manufacture an advanced
jet aircraft."94 Conversely, it has also been speculated that the Soviet Union did assist
India during the conflict by threatening to cut off the supply of oil to the Chinese air
force, which would have grounded the Chinese air campaign.95 But the slow Soviet
response to India's military needs was quickly corrected and coincided with a pullback in
American military aid to India.
3. Soviet Support of Indian Rearmament: 1962-65
Shocked out of their selective pacifism, the Indians became arms-hungry.
In effect, they are now trying, within two years, to make up for fifteen
years of neglect.96
Following its humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian War, India began a program to
rapidly modernize its armed forces. After having gone ten years with defense spending
93 Richard L. Siegel, "Chinese Efforts to Influence Soviet Policy To India," India
Quarterly (July-September 1968): 223.
94 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 233.
95 J. A.Naik, 157.
96
"Indians to Arms," The Economist (8 June 1963): 993.
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never exceeding two percent of its Gross National Product,97 India increased its defense
expenditure in 1963 to over four percent of the gross national product (GNP). Figure 2.1
reflects the pattern of Indian defense spending, as a percentage of GNP, during the final
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Figure 2.1: Indian Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1962-89
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade. 1971 through 1993 Series
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
In 1 964, India passed legislation for a five-year defense procurement plan ( 1 964-
69) that was a direct result of India's 1962 defeat and that was geared towards developing
a credible conventional deterrence posture against China. 98 Among the primary goals of
The First Five-Year Defense Plan were the following procurement objectives: to double
97 Fiscal years 1951-52 to 1961-62. S. Nihal Singh, 710; and Lome J. Kavic, "Force
Posture: India and Pakistan," in Frank B. Horton, et al., Comparative Defense Policy
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 42.
98 Shelton Williams, The U.S., India and the Bomb, 29-30. Major Edgar O'Ballance, 13.
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the size of the army to 825,000 well-equipped men; to equip and man forty-five Air Force
squadrons and improve air defense capabilities; and to maintain the current strength of
the navy while phasing out outdated naval vessels and replacing them with modern
warships." Additionally, the Plan highlighted the need to strengthen and improve the
domestic defense industry. 100 These incompatible elements, the need for rapid
procurement and an insufficient defense industry to support said procurement, would
force India to again look externally to meet its military needs.
The strong response to India's military requirements initially shown by the United
States in the fall of 1962 began to stagnate in 1963. The voluntary withdrawal of Chinese
forces in 1 962 and the continuation of pro-Pakistani sentiment in the Pentagon resulted in
restraint in U.S. military support to India in 1 962-65. 101 Additionally, there was a
concern that if the United States provided a large amount of aid and became more aligned
with India, Sino-Russian relations might improve. 102 While the United States would
99 P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Cooperation: A Review," 235.
100 Ibid.
101 S. Nihal Singh, 711-12. Dennis Kux, 213. Richard L. Siegel, Evaluating the Result
of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American Efforts in India, 10. It is also possible that the
dismissal of the pro-Soviet Krishna Menon as India's Defense Minister, following the
1962 conflict, may have led American officials to believe that a major conduit to strong
Indo-Soviet military cooperation was now removed, thus decreasing the necessity for a
strong American military courtship of India.
102
"Indians to Arms," The Economist (08 June 1963): 993. Moscow's negative reaction
to a 1963 joint air exercise by India, Britain and the United States highlights this fear.
See Richard L. Siegel, Evaluating the Result of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American
Efforts in India, 26.
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provide India with $97 million worth of military equipment, mostly radar systems, air
defense weapons and cold weather equipment, 103 Indian requests for major weapons
systems were not granted. 104 "The result was to push India into military purchases from
the Soviet Union because Pakistani objections prevailed over Indian requests for
weapons." 105
In the first six months after the Chinese invasion, Indo-Soviet military relations
were uncertain. By February 1963, the Soviet Union had only delivered four of the
nineteen MiG-21s provided for in the 1962 MiG deal. 106 But Soviet military cooperation
with India quickly accelerated in the spring and summer of 1963, propelled most likely by
increasing Sino-Soviet tensions, 107 the appearance of an American attempt to engage
India following the Chinese invasion, and a Soviet Third World policy of "overoptimistic
activism." 108 In August 1963, India and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for the
103 S. Nihal Singh, 711-12. Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weaponry for South Asia." 52.
104 In 1964, India was primarily interested in purchasing F-104 fighters, which were
vastly superior to the MiG- 17s/ 19s flown by China and which the United States had
begun selling to Pakistan in the late 1950s. Among India's military leadership, there was
a preference for American hardware as well as an apprehension of becoming too reliant
on the Soviet Union for hardware. Hemen Ray, 187. The United States did, however,
begin to collaborate in 1963 with India on its domestic missile program. This is
discussed below.
105 Dilip Mukerjee, "U.S. Weaponry for India," Asian Survey 26, no. 6 (June 1987): 595.
106 Hemen Ray, 186.
107 Siegel, 221. William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65 (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1967), 11-15. S. Nihal Singh, 711.
108 Peter Zwick, 287.
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transfer of light and heavy tanks, heavy artillery, surface to air missiles for the northern
air defense network, and an unspecified number of MiGs. Additionally, the Soviet Union
agreed to help India build a missile training center and to supply the radar and training
equipment necessary. 109 By the end of 1963, the Soviet Union had helped India build an
"airframe factory at Nasik, an engine factory at Koraput and a factory at Hyderabad to
produce air-to-air missiles and radar equipment." 110 In September 1964, the Soviet
Union extended "military credits" for the procurement of forty-four additional MiG-2 1 s,
twenty helicopters, and seventy PT-76 tanks. 111 Addressing India's need for rapid
procurement and the Indian quest to develop its indigenous industry, the Soviet Union
used post-war fears and Western ambivalence to solidify its position as India's chief arms
supplier. 112 "Hence, it was basically the non-availability of Western arms that led to
India's shift towards the Soviet Union." 113 Figure 2.2, below, reflects the primary
sources of Indian and Pakistani foreign procurement from 1964 to 1973.
109 HemenRay, 186.
110 Ibid.
111 S. Nihal Singh, 712.
1 12 This view should be considered as being from the Soviet perspective. Even after the
1963 arms deals, India continued its attempt to purchase American F-104s, with a
mission being sent to the United States in June 1964. See, Dennis Kux, 229. Hemen
Ray, 188. Failing in its attempt to diversify its procurement sources, India continued to
fall into deeper reliance on Soviet arms.
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us USSR FRANCE UK CZECH PRC OTHERS
M INDIA 88 1273 48 89 125 74
PAKISTAN 160 24 214 8 312 133
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-73
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency): 71.
Figure 2.2: Major Arms Suppliers to India and Pakistan, 1964-73
D. THE GREEN SIGNAL: INDIA'S NUCLEAR "OPTION"
In addition to expediting India's procurement of Soviet hardware, the Chinese
invasion of 1962 had a much more obvious and long-term impact upon Indian strategic
thinking - the emergence of a Chinese threat. Whether one subscribes to the belief that
China is a real strategic threat or a perceived threat manipulated by domestic politicians
and mythmakers, the shattering of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" in the
autumn of 1962 would continue to reemerge in Indian strategic dialogue for the
remainder of the century. The image of a Chinese threat would take one more fateful step
with China's first nuclear weapon test on 16 October 1964. Whether real or imagined.
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the Chinese threat, embodied in an atomic mushroom cloud, provided the necessary
catalyst for the weaponization of India's nuclear program.
1. India's Nuclear Program, 1948-1964
The history of India's nuclear energy program dates back to the creation of its
Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 and is often presented as one of nuclear restraint.
Concerned about India's economic development, Nehru initiated India's civilian nuclear
power program under the auspices of the American-sponsored Atoms for Peace program.
Nehru was further motivated by the desire to ensure that India did not remain a
"backward country" as it had after missing out on the development of steam power and
the subsequent industrial revolution. 114 He qualified the pursuit of a nuclear energy
program, however, by stating that "we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from
war." 115 While the introduction of nuclear technology into India was under the auspices
of economic and developmental incentives, Nehru nonetheless laid the nuclear foundation
that would permit India to pursue the nuclear option in the mid-1960s. 116
1 14 Amitabh Mattoo, ed. India 's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi,
Har-Anand Publications, 1999), 16-17. For a detailed discussion of Nehru's vision of
science, embodied in nuclear power, as a tool for national prestige, see Itty Abraham, The
Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecay and the Postcolonial State
(London: Zed Books Ltd, 1998), 46-63.
115 Amitabh Mattoo, 17.
116 Contrary to the traditional perception of Nehru as being vehemently against nuclear
weapons, Mattoo cites a 1948 speech to the new India Department of Atomic Energy in
which Nehru states, "[0]f course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it [nuclear
technology] for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments will stop the nation from
using it that way." See Amitabh Mattoo, 1 7. Abraham argues that Nehru believed he had
37
The early steps of India's nuclear development were made with Western
assistance under the Atoms for Peace program. India's initial benefactor for nuclear
knowledge became Great Britain, which provided India with six kilograms of enriched
uranium fuel rods and technical data and drawings to develop a "swimming pool type"
research reactor. 117 This one-megawatt (1MW) reactor, named Aspara, went critical in
August 1956. 118
While developing Aspara, India also planned the next step in its "indigenous"
civilian power program, a large research reactor. Negotiations took place with the Soviet
Union, the United States, Great Britain and Canada in 1955. The United States could not
conclude an agreement with India because "the Government of India strongly objects to
the safeguards and control provisions which are a necessary part of our bilateral
agreements." 119 While preferring a "more advanced" British reactor design, Homi
Bhabha finally settled on a 40MW Canadian NRX reactor in September 1955. 120 Named
a "super-patriotic" ability to control the dangerous potential of atomic energy and to
ensure it was channeled for peaceful purposes. See Abraham, 48.
117 Itty Abraham, 84-5.
118 Ibid., 85. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 22.
119 Letter from the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission to the
President of the United States (30 August 1956): 2. Digital National Security Archives,
Nonproliferation Collection. Item Number: NP00272.
120 Itty Abraham, 90-91. Abraham cites a 1989 unpublished MA thesis which argues that
Canada lobbied India hard to secure this contract to "set the stage for further possible
ventures" and to also make a statement of "the difference between American and
Canadian approaches to both atomic energy and North-South relations." See Abraham,
90; and Iris Lonergun, "The Negotiations Between Canada and India for the Supply of the
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Cirus, this Canadian-built reactor went critical in 1960. By the time China detonated its
first nuclear weapon in 1964, India had commissioned the Trombay plutonium-
reprocessing facility, with the assistance of chemical reprocessing data that had been
made public by France. 121 By developing and commissioning both the Trombay and
Cirus facilities outside the parameters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards regulations, India in 1964 had the ability to produce limited amounts of
unsafeguarded fissile material. 122
After India was humiliated by China in 1962, it was the common perception of
most Indian leaders that "India could not be caught in that position again." 123 A debate
within the Indian legislature immediately escalated between those who advocated the
immediate development of nuclear weapons ("a small group"), those who opposed
weaponizing altogether and those who wanted to constantly "re-examine" the nuclear
NRX Nuclear Research Reactor, 1955-56: A Case Study of Participatory
Internationalism," unpublished MA thesis (Ottawa: Carleton University, August 1989).
121 Rodney W. Jones, et al, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and
Charts, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998),
119, footnote 9.
122 itty Abraham, 120-24. It has been argued that the United States prevented India from
conducting a nuclear test following China's 1964 test with the implicit threat of cutting
off PL 480 food grants. See Michael Edwardes, "India, Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons,"
International Affairs, 43, no. 4 (October 1967): 658, cited in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu,
38. A more critical analysis of the technical and bureaucratic factors influencing Indian
restraint is offered below.
123 Confidential Airgram, from the United States Embassy, India, to the U.S. Department
of State (27 November 1964). Digital National Security Archive, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Collection. Item Number: NP01050.
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question. 124 While Prime Minister Shastri "flatly stated that if such weapons are ever
made in India it will not be by [a] ministry headed by him," 125 he nonetheless gave Homi
Bhabha, the "father of India's nuclear programme," the "green signal to pursue India's
nuclear-weapon option." 126
Shastri 's approval of the "nuclear option" highlights a key factor in understanding
Indian strategic culture. By pursuing a nuclear "option" and not a "weapon," India's
leadership was showing restraint in the development of its nuclear program. India was
developing a nuclear capability and option only for defensive purposes and was not
bellicose like the United States and the Soviet Union. Table 2.3 shows an Indian
perspective on the nuclear restraint it has historically shown. This concept of Indian
restraint, or the perception ofrestraint, is discussed in Chapter IV. 127
2. Shastri's Quest for Nuclear Protection
While Homi Bhabha was given the political authority to develop a nuclear option,
India approached the United States and Soviet Union for joint nuclear protection against
124 Ibid.
125 Secret Telegram from American Embassy, New Delhi, to the U.S. Department of
State (21 January 1965). Digital National Security Archive, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Collection. Item Number: NP01 102.
126 Mattoo, 17. Shrikant Paranjpe, "American Policy Toward Problems of Nuclear
Proliferation in South Asia: An Indian Perspective," Asian Affairs 16, no. 4 (Winter
1989-90): 192.
127 This study also examines how the "perception" of restraint can be as important as
actual restraint in the course of Indian military and nuclear expansion. It is argued that
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the emerging Chinese nuclear threat. 128 According to The Economist, "The tensions
between India and China are not going to be resolved by some form of words. The real
value of such a joint declaration would lie in the fact that it would involve Russia with the
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Indian restraint was also the product of external pressures, fiscal restraints and
technological barriers.
128 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 86-88; Itty Abraham, 56-7; and
Dennis Kux, 263-64.
129
"India and the Bomb," The Economist (12 December 1964): 1221.
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Despite India's apparent desire to secure multilateral nuclear protection, and the potential
implications for global nonproliferation efforts if said request was not granted, neither the
Soviet Union or the United States was forthcoming.
The unwillingness of the Soviet Union to provide a nuclear umbrella to India was
most likely influenced by ideological considerations. 130 To guarantee nuclear protection
to a capitalist state over a fellow communist state, even one with which a rift had
emerged, would have undermined the domestic and international foundations of the
communist movement. This ideologically awkward situation would have been even
further amplified by aligning Soviet weapons with American weapons against
Communist China.
On initial inspection, it seems that the United States may well have had reason to
provide a nuclear guarantee to India in 1964. In 1963, a memorandum from Secretary of
Defense McNamara to President Kennedy stated that the primary motivation for India
pursuing nuclear weapons would be China's possession of nuclear weapons. 131 In June
1964, four months prior to China's nuclear test, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk is
reported to have recommended that, should China test, the United States should consider
providing India and Japan with nuclear weapons. 132
130 Lome J. Kavic, 378.
131
"The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement,"
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President John F.
Kennedy, Secret (12 February 1963). Table One. Declassified 01 June 1977.
132 Peter Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies
4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 714.
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Nevertheless, the United States did not provide India with a public pledge of
nuclear protection. The American rationale most likely lies with a limited American
strategic interest in South Asia, the growing strategic focus on Vietnam, and a resumption
of American arms transfers to Pakistan. 133 It has also been argued that the United States
prevented India from testing in 1964 by blackmailing it with Public Law 480 food aid
funds. 134 Additionally, it may have been assumed that the removal of Menon and the
death of Nehru placed in power a government more susceptible to American pressure.
While the United States would not provide India with a nuclear umbrella, it would
provide technical assistance to India's future ballistic missile program.
3. The Development of India's Missile Program
Another factor most likely driving India's preference for a nuclear "option" over a
"weapon" is the fact that, in 1964, India did not have a credible means with which to
deliver a nuclear warhead to a high-value target in China. Having a weapon without a
delivery vehicle would have been a hollow deterrent. "[Njuclear weapons would serve no
defensive or deterrent purpose while India lacked the delivery capabilities to attack
Chinese nuclear launching systems or Chinese industrial centers. The Indian space
133 Shelton Williams, 33. In 1967, the United States partially lifted the 1965 embargo
against India and Pakistan by allowing the shipment of spare parts, a decision which
obviously favored Pakistan's military, which relied on American military hardware.
134 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 38.
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program had started only in 1 963 and was still a long way from developing its own rocket
systems that could be converted into a ballistic missile delivery system." 135
Similar to the path taken by India's nuclear weapons program, India's ballistic
missile program began under the auspices of a "peaceful" space program. As in the
Atoms for Peace Program, India again found the West to be the main supplier of its
technological and financial needs. In 1963, United States launched an experimental
sounding rocket from India's Thumba test range. This launch would be followed by over
350 similar launches during the next twelve years at the Thumba range by the United
States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. 136 In November 1963, India would
launch its first research rocket, which was based on the American Nike sounding
rocket. 137
In the period 1963-64, A.PJ. Abdul Kalam spent four months training in the
United States at various NASA facilities, including the Langely Research Center where
the U.S. Scout rocket program was coordinated. Upon his return in 1964, Kalam began
work on India's Space Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) program. In 1965, Homi Bhabha, the
"father of India's nuclear program," requested, and received, from the United States
135 Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or
Development?" World Politics 38, no. 2 (January 1986): 324.
136 Gary Milhollin, "India's Missiles: With A Little Help From Our Friends," Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists (November 1989): 31-32.
137 Gennadiy Khromov, "A View of India's Policy on Missile and Nuclear
Nonproliferation," Yadernyy Kontrol 41, no. 5 (September-October 1998): 5. Translated
by FBIS. Document ID: FTS 19990 12700 1680.
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unclassified technological reports on the Scout missile. 138 When the SLV-3 was finally
launched in 1980, experts would consider it a copy of the U.S. Scout rocket. 139 Moreover,
the first stage of the SLV-3 would become the first stage of India's Agni missile, an
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). 140 By the late 1980s, forty percent of Indian
space technology was perceived to have been of American origin. 141
E. 1965 INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT
In August 1965, Pakistani-backed guerrilla forces infiltrated into Kashmir and
began a campaign to incite a Kashmiri rebellion against Indian rule. When Indian regular
forces responded to the insurrection and closed down vital entry points to the guerrillas,
thus cutting-off their supply lines, Pakistan's military leadership launched a major ground
attack. On 6 September, India's army launched a counter-campaign into Pakistan. The
1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict had begun.
1. American Politics
America's response to the outbreak of fighting in South Asia was a decision to
embargo arms shipments to both India and Pakistan. From the Indian perspective, it was
138 Gary Millhollin, 32.
139 Ibid. Anita Bhatia, "India's Space Program: Cause for Concern?" Asian Survey 25,
no. 10 (October 1985): 1024.
140 Gary Millhollin, 32.
141 David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International
Security 21, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97): 106. A more extensive discussion of Soviet and
European assistance to India's space program in the 1970s and 1980s follows below.
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the victim of "injured innocence" and was being penalized for Pakistani aggression. 142
American military aid promised after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict was stopped, with
only $75.6 million of the $157 million package delivered. 143 Moreover, the Pakistani
forces that threatened India were not of the same quality as the forces that India had
fought eighteen years earlier. Pakistan attacked India using the weapon systems it had
procured from the United States over the previous decade. "Pakistan would not have
become a serious military power without U.S. equipment; virtually her entire army and
Air Force were equipped with relatively modern U.S. weapons; most notably M-47 and
M-48 Patton Tanks (once the main battle tank for NATO), and B-57 light attack jet
bombers." 144 The United States also sold Pakistan a squadron of F-104s in 1964, the
same year that it denied a request by India. 145 To exacerbate the Indian perspective of
"injured innocence," the United States, after enacting the embargo, did not block, and
may have facilitated, the transfer to Pakistan of a squadron of F-104s from Libya and
Jordan 146 and a squadron of F-86s from West Germany and Iran. 147
142 Sumit Ganguly, Naval Postgraduate School conference presentation. It should also be
noted, however, that while Indian pride was injured, Pakistan's reliance on American
hardware made the initial impact of the embargo much more significant to Pakistan. A
consequence of the American embargo was that Pakistan turned to China and received
200 medium tanks and several IL-28 bombers. S. Nihal Singh, 713
143 Richard L. Siegel, Evaluating the Result of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American
Efforts in India, 10.
144 Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis," 52.
145 The Economist (26 September 1964): 1208.
146 Ram R. Subramanian, 38.
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2. Soviet Reliability
While India considered the United States' unwillingness to support it against
Pakistani aggression as a validation of its anti-American suspicions, the 1965 Indo-
Pakistani conflict would also highlight to India the role of the Soviet Union as a reliable
supplier of military hardware. 148 Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in September, the
Soviet Union offered India submarines, 149 destroyers and escorts after the United States
rejected an Indian request for three destroyers. 150 Furthermore, during the brief period of
fighting in the fall, the Soviet Union did not stop its shipments of arms to India. 151 The
Soviet Union's desire to maintain and strengthen military ties with India in 1965 may be
linked to its desire to keep India from turning westwards following Nehru's death in
1964, 152 as well as Khrushchev's continued pro-Indian and anti-Chinese stance.
147 S.Nihal Singh, 713.
148 S.Nihal Singh, 713.
149 India entered into a submarine deal with the Soviet Union only after its traditional
supplier of naval vessels, Great Britain, refused to give India credit or accept payments in
rupees, and after the United States said no, owing to Pakistani-American politics. See
HemenRay, 190.
150 S. Nihal Singh, 713. One month before the Pakistani invasion, India and the Soviet
Union had reached an agreement to transfer four to six submarines and to train Indian
crews in the Soviet Union. See Hemen Ray, 191.
151 S.Nihal Singh, 713.
152 Dennis Kux, 38.
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3. The Treaty of Tashkent
In late September, India and Pakistan ceased hostilities in the Kashmir region
following pressure from the United Nations Security Council. While neither state
achieved a territorial success, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in
halting the Pakistani-backed insurgency. 153 Three months later, under the new leadership
of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union brokered the Treaty of Tashkent.
In an attempt to reverse some of the damage done to Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-
Pakistani relations by Khrushchev's pro-Indian policies, Brezhnev approached Tashkent
with the objective of promoting Soviet neutrality in the sub-continent. From the
American perspective, Brezhnev's approach to the South Asian crisis was welcomed.
Prior to the Tashkent negotiations, Dean Rusk told the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations:
I am not particularly opposed to the Soviet Union having a fling at trying
to bring these two countries together. I doubt that they would succeed in
doing it, but if they did, then although it would be a substantial diplomatic
feather in the Soviets' cap, it might also lead the way to an arrangement in
the sub-continent that we ourselves could live with. 154
153 Ibid., 238.
154
"Statement of the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, before the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Secret)," The United States Senate Report of
Proceedings, vol. 1, no. 2 of3 (13 October 1965), 36. Declassified.
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While the Soviet Union would in fact secure a short-term peace between India and
Pakistan, its "neutrality" in South Asian affairs would also be of only a short duration. 155
F. NON-PROLIFERATION, DROUGHTS AND CHINA, 1965-70
During the five years following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani Conflict, the United
States reduced its military presence in South Asia while its strategic focus centered on the
war in Vietnam. Economically, the United States responded to India's worst drought in
over a century with massive relief and better monetary terms than those provided by the
Soviet Union. India, however, viewed the American food aid program as a tool of
diplomatic "blackmail." 156 In March 1966, President Johnson offered food aid to India
under the condition that American-dictated agricultural policies were implemented.
While India did agree to and implemented the American demands, the food aid
experience of 1966 left an impression on India's leadership of American meddling in
India's internal affairs. The reaction of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was that
India would "never beg for food again." 157 It has also been reported that the United
States attempted to tie its food aid package to India with Indian support in the United
155 Richard Siegel, 13. While the Soviet Union would transfer 12 Mi-6 helicopters to
Pakistan in 1967, it would also sign a simultaneous agreement with India for the transfer
of one hundred SU-7s. S. Nihal Singh, 714. Hemen Ray, 192
156 Richard Siegel, 7.
157 Dennis Kux, 257.
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Nations for America's Vietnam policy. 158 If true, this incident probably also caused
considerable consternation among India's leadership.
Adding to the Indian suspicions of American food aid were several other
diplomatic points of consternation between India and the United States during the late
1960s. The American and Soviet promotion of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty was
countered by open Indian defiance of the regime. While India supported the goal of a
nuclear-weapons-free world, it contended that the NPT fell far short of said goal since it
did not contain provisions for a comprehensive ban of further nuclear testing. Moreover,
New Delhi pointed out, it did not call for the freezing of nuclear weapons production in
the current nuclear power states; and it did not stipulate a schedule for reducing (and
eliminating) nuclear weapons stockpiles. 159 Furthermore, India's leadership was
infuriated with the notion that China would be rewarded for its 1 964 test, which placed it
within the cut off window to qualify as "a nuclear weapons state," while India would
conversely be punished for showing nuclear "restraint," 160 thereby missing the cut off
window. 161 In the months leading up to the final treaty conference, India was considered
158 Myron Weiner, lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (06
December 1998).
159 Shelton Williams, 47.
160 Ibid., 49.
161 According to Article DC of the NPT, "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-
weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967."
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to be the biggest obstacle to the successful negotiation and implementation of the
treaty. 162
While the U.S. State Department privately acknowledged in 1968 that India was
the "more important power" in South Asia, 163 military preference continued to be given
to Pakistan. In 1967, the United States had partially lifted the 1965 embargo imposed on
India and Pakistan by allowing the shipment of spare parts. 164 This decision, while
intended to show America's balance in its handling of South Asian affairs, clearly favored
the Pakistani military with its abundant stockpile of American hardware. Finally, in
1970, the United States authorized a "one-time exception" for the sale of 300 APCs to
Pakistan for $13.3 million. 165 As the American use of the Peshawar air base for
electronic warfare and U-2 spy plane missions ended in 1969, 166 this "exception" was
most likely approved to facilitate the use of Pakistan as the medium through which the
United States would initiate its engagement with China in the 1970s.
While the Soviet Union had declared "neutrality" in the sub-continent following
the Treaty of Tashkent, the limited scope of arms sales to Pakistan was greatly
162 The Economist (20 May 1967): 770.
163 Preparatory Notes for U.S. Secretary of State Meeting with Morarji Desai, Deputy
Prime Minister of India. Department of State Memorandum [Secret] (25 September
1968): 4. Declassified 15 March 1996. LBJ Library Collection.
164 Ibid., "Current Policy and Its Options" Addendum. Shelton Williams, 33.
165 Stephen P. Cohen, 62. The delivery of the APCs did not occur until 1973 because of
the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.
166 Shelton Williams, 34. Stephen P. Cohen, 53.
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overshadowed by growing Soviet assistance to India's naval forces. The first Soviet
submarine was delivered to India in July 1968, 167 and by the end of 1969, India had
secured contracts with the Soviet Union for the delivery of twenty-four naval vessels,
"including three submarines, six light frigates, six patrol boats, six motor torpedo boats,
three landing crafts and destroyers." 168 Additionally, the Soviet Union offered to help
India develop its Port Blair naval facility on the Andaman Islands in the outer Bay of
Bengal. 169 In return for these sales and military assistance, the Soviet Union requested
the use of mainland Indian ports for the deployment of its navy. India denied this Soviet
request, but did offer the Soviet Union use of Indian naval facilities for the repair and re-
supply of Soviet vessels. 170 A similar agreement already existed with the United States.
Despite this Indo-Soviet rift over the permanent basing of Soviet forces in India, the late
1960s would signal a complete immersion of all three branches of India's military into




170 Hemen Ray, 193. In 1969, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with Pakistan
to develop the Gwadar submarine facility, fifty miles east of the Iranian border. While
this cooperation never materialized, the Indian perspective at the time was that this Soviet
















50 AMX- 13 (French)
1 F-Class Submarine (Soviet) 3 F-Class Submarine: (Soviet)




5 Petya-Class Frigate: (Soviet)
2 Osa-Class Patrol (Soviet)
5 Poulchat-Class Patrol (Soviet)
6 Polnocny Landing (Soviet)
4 Leander Frigates (Indian)
Combat 4 Mig-21 Squadrons (Soviet) 4 Mig-21 Sqdns: (Indo-Soviet) 2 Mig-21 Squadrons (Indian)
Aircraft XA SU-7 Squadron (Soviet) 6 SU-7 Squadron (Soviet) 1 Gnat Squadron (Indian)
2 Vt. Gnat Squadrons (Indian) 4 Y2 Gnat Squadrons (Indian) 2 HF-24 Squadrons (Indian)
2 HF-24 Squadrons (Indian)
Other 100 mm. Guns
Major 130 mm. Guns








Source: Data derived from, P. R. Chari, "Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review,"
Asian Survey 19, no. 3 (March 1979): 237, Table 1.
Table 2.4: Major Military Equipment Procured by India, 1964-1976
G. 1971 : AMERICAN POLITICS, SOVIET COOPERATION AND WAR
The year 1971 would be a definitive year in Indo-Soviet military cooperation and
Indo-American diplomatic relations. The year commenced with the congressional
testimony of former U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles that the United States knew "from
the outset" in 1954 that Pakistan's "military build-up [using American arms] was in fact
directed against India." 171 During the spring, President Nixon and Secretary of State
Kissinger would begin efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations with China. In August,
India and the Soviet Union would sign their first Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
171 Bowles quoted in The Hindustan Times (21 January 1971), cited in Hemen Ray, 180.
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At the year's end, in the waning days of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the United States
would deploy the USS Enterprise and an Amphibious Task Force to the Bay of Bengal.
From the Indian perspective, 1971 would therefore be a year in which the United States
aligned itself with India's two main rivals while the Soviet Union reinforced its
commitment to Indian security and military expansion.
1. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
A major advance in Indo-Soviet relations came in the summer of 1971 when
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited India. On 9 August, less than a month
after Kissinger's trip to China, India and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The primary elements of the treaty were Articles VIII
and EX which emphasized, respectively, that each nation "shall not enter into or
participate in any military alliance directed against the other Party," and that each would
"abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict
with the other Party." 172 The timing of this bilateral treaty does not appear to be
haphazard, because it followed the recent strengthening of US-Chinese relations and it
preceded the Third Indo-Pakistani War by less than four months. 173 For both the Soviet
172 Bimal Prasad, 393.
173 It has been speculated by some observers that India may well have entered the Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union knowing that conflict with Pakistan
was imminent and hoping that Soviet support would keep China from bearing arms
against India.
54
Union and India, the emergence of a Sino-American detente in 1971 made the
strengthening of Indo-Soviet relations prudent.
The context and quality of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation is perceived differently, however. India was in fact simply one of numerous
developing countries with which the Soviet Union signed such treaties. Under Brezhnev,
the Soviet Union employed Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation to develop a "system
of client states in the Third World." 174 Moreover, unlike most of the twelve Soviet
Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, the Indo-Soviet treaty was one of the few in
which direct military assistance was not guaranteed.
While the Western powers viewed the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty as evidence that
India had entered the Soviet camp, 175 India's Prime Minister at the time, Indira Gandhi,
was adamant that the new Treaty of Cooperation was "not a reversal of the Indian
traditional nonalignment policy." 176 An analysis of Article DC of the Treaty shows that
the declaration does stop short of bilateral military operations. "In the event of either
Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall
immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take
174 Peter Zwick, 289.
175 Dennis Kux states that following the signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, "Nixon
regarded India as a Soviet client" up through the end of the December 1971 Indo-
Pakistani War. Dennis Kux, 296.
176 Quoted in Edgar O'Ballance, Tracks of the Bear: Soviet Imprints in the Seventies
(Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1982), 154.
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appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries." 177
Furthermore, Prime Minister Gandhi's commitment to Indian non-alignment would be
validated two years later when Brezhnev visited India. Brezhnev wanted to conclude a
"Soviet-Indian Collective Security Agreement," but Indira Gandhi refused the offer on
the grounds that it would go against India's non-alignment policy. 178
From the Soviet perspective, the deepening of Sino-Pakistani relations and the
emergence of a Sino-American dialogue in 1 97 1 seriously reduced Soviet influence in the
sub-continent. Moreover, an increase in American naval activity in the Indian Ocean
raised strategic concerns for the Soviet Union as well.
A U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean was thought to permit the
United States to exercise its nuclear deterrent with fewer nuclear
submarines. The range of Polaris and Poseidon missiles is relatively
limited, and while Trident signifies a marked improvement in that respect,
their presence in the Indian Ocean would greatly aggravate Soviet ASW
problems. Simultaneously, U.S. targeting flexibility would be enhanced
vis-a-vis some targets in the Soviet Union. The Indian Ocean was thus
regarded as an attractive deployment site for U.S. SLBMs because the
Soviet Union would find it most difficult to deploy adequate ASW forces
there to contain the U.S. threat of attack from the sea. 179
For the Soviet Union, therefore, the strategic isolation and military requirements that
India experienced as a result of the Sino-American-Pakistani detente provided an
opportune foothold for further Indo-Soviet cooperation.
177 Bimal Prasad, 393-94. Emphasis added.
178 Ibid., 155.
179 Selig S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean:
Indian and American Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 86.
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2. The 1971 Bangladesh Crisis
On 3 December 1971, Pakistan launched an air raid against eight airfields in
western India. 180 The build-up to this air strike, however, was one year in the making.
As a result of a December 1970 election, which elevated a "Bengali regionalist" to the
position of Pakistan's Prime Minister, Pakistan's military had begun in March 1971
systematic attacks on members of the Hindu population in East Pakistan which would
result, by one account, in the death of one million civilians as well as ten million refugees
displaced into India. 181 Hoping to draw Indian military might away from the escalating
conflict in East Pakistan, Pakistan took the first major military action in the 1971 Indo-
Pakistani War.
India responded to the Pakistani air strike by launching counterattacks in East and
West Pakistan. Additionally, India recognized the displaced Bengali government-in-exile
as the rightful government of Bangladesh. The United States responded to these Indian
actions by declaring that India was escalating the conflict, and Washington therefore
"hardened its stance toward India." 182 Among the initial actions taken by the United
States was the suspension of the sale of military equipment to India, including a $70
million communications upgrade for India's air defense network. 183 One week after the
180 Dennis Kux, 302.
181 Sanjoy Banerjee, "Explaining the American 'Tilt' in the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis: A
Late Dependency Approach," International Studies Quarterly 31 (1987): 201.
182 Dennis Kux, 302.
183 Ibid.
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initial Pakistani air strike, and as India was exploiting its military successes against the
Pakistani forces, the United States dispatched the USS Enterprise and a Marine
amphibious unit from off the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal. While the reported
purpose of the deployment was to ensure the safety of American citizens, the Indian
government saw it as a direct challenge to India's success over Pakistan. 184 Henry
Kissinger would later state that the purposes of this American "tilt" towards Pakistan
were to protect West Pakistan from possible retaliatory Indian strikes and to signal to
China that, in times of crisis, the United States could be counted on as a reliable
partner. 185 From the Indian perspective, "The sailing of the USS Enterprise was the
ultimate in symbolic insult...Above all, it is remembered as a nuclear as well as a military
threat." 186 The thought of China, Pakistan and the United States all cooperating together
184 George Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 1
(Winter 1992): 139. "From India to North Africa: Sowing a Missile Crop," in Exploring
U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010: What are the Policy and Technology
Challenges! Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (April, 1997). Available online
<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/advocate/ifpa/report696_ch4_ind.htm>.Myron Weiner,
NPS lecture. Weiner aptly described the 1971 incident as a "footnote in US Navy
history," but an insult to all Indians to this very day.
185 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 21. Dennis Kux, 305. In a detailed analysis of numerous
official accounts of the 1971 "tilt," Sanjoy Banerjee concludes that "American diplomatic
support for Pakistan, its small-scale arms supply, and above all, the dispatch of the fleet,
can be explained as the discharge of the role of guarantor of client states." See Banerjee,
215.
186 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 21.
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raised Indian isolation and anxiety to new heights and further strengthened Indo-Soviet
ties. 187
H. PNE, PROCUREMENT DIVERSIFICATION AND AFGHANISTAN,
1974-79
The 1970s would be a decade in which India demonstrated its nuclear capabilities,
attempted to diversify its military procurement sources and found its regional security
challenged by the injection of Cold War tensions into the sub-continent. Changes in
India's political leadership during the decade would shift India from a pro-Moscow
stance, to a more balanced and diversified East-West approach. India would conclude the
decade still dependent upon the Soviet Union for most major military hardware.
1. India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, 1974
On 18 May 1974, after receiving authorization from Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) conducted a Peaceful Nuclear
Explosion (PNE). 188 The rationale for the change in India's nuclear posture has often
been linked to changes in India's security environment. Most notably, the events of 1971
187 Sanjoy Banerjee, 202.
188 In a 1991 book and a 1997 conversation, Raja Ramanna, the "architect" of the
Pokhran I test, debunks the notion of a PNE and suggests that Pokhran I was in fact a test
of a nuclear weapon. See Toby F. Dalton, "Towards Nuclear Rollback in South Asia,"
Current History (December 1998): 413; and Mattoo, 17. The argument that Pokhran I
was motivated by more than "peaceful" purposes is also supported by the fact that Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, who authorized the PNE, planned additional tests in 1982-83 that
were canceled due to U.S. pressure. See Mattoo, 18, and "The Nuclear Journey Through
Various Governments," India Today (25 May 1998). Available on-line: www.india-
today.com/itoday/2505 1 998/march.html.
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have been pointed to as having had a great impact upon India's decision-makers. Any
Indian hope for American nuclear protection versus China diminished as Sino-American
ties improved. 189 The American conduct of "gunboat diplomacy" with the nuclear-armed
USS Enterprise highlighted India's strategic vulnerability in a nuclear world. 190 While
these strategic concerns may well have provided useful material for the rhetoric of India's
bomb lobby, a closer examination of India's domestic environment in 1974 clarifies the
political, technical and organizational factors that led to ten years of Indian "restraint" and
the eventual 1974 PNE.
Domestic support for Indira Gandhi's Congress Party "had fallen to an all time
low in late 1973 and early 1974 due to a prolonged and severe domestic recession, the
eruption of large-scale riots in a number of regions, and the lingering effects of the
splintering of the ruling Congress Party." 191 By conducting a PNE, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi demonstrated India's "peaceful" nuclear capability to the world and
increased her overall domestic approval rating by one-third. 192 One catalyst to India's
1974 PNE, therefore, can be considered domestic politics.
189 Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs," 326.
190 Sanjoy Banerjee, 202.
191 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" International Security 21,
no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), 68. This view is also expressed in, Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's
Nuclear and Space Programs," 326.
192 A poll taken in June 1974 also showed that 90 percent of the adult literate population
polled were "personally proud of the achievement." Ibid.
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Organizational and technical factors also contributed to the ten-year delay
between the "green signal" and the PNE. In January 1966, Homi Bhabha, the father of
India's atomic program, died in a plane crash while en route to an IAEA meeting in
Vienna. 193 Having chaired and directed numerous agencies within India's nuclear
establishment at the time of his death, Bhabha seemed irreplaceable. Following Bhabha's
death, Indira Gandhi chose Vikram Sarabhai as the second chair of the Atomic Energy
Commission and as the secretary to the Department of Atomic Energy, "the senior civil
position in the government." 194 Sarabhai's view of the nuclear "option" was markedly
different from that held by Bhabha. Under Bhabha, the AEC pursued the nuclear option
as a symbol of state achievement and as a link between national development and
security. 195 Sarabhai, however, considered the channeling of funds towards the
development of an "option" a waste of limited resources, especially in light of the cost
associated with procuring delivery vehicles. 196
From an organizational viewpoint, therefore, having Sarabhai assume several key
posts in 1966 that controlled the direction of and funding for India's nuclear option would
bureaucratically and financially demote the importance of the option. This "demotion"
would be amplified into a technical "restraint" on India's nuclear program as reduced
193 Itty Abraham, 129.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid, 144-45.
196 Quoted in J. P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol 2. (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974):
179-80, cited in Itty Abraham, 143-44.
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funding to research and development projects would delay India's capability to pursue an
option. 197 The explanation for India's 1974 PNE should therefore be viewed as the
delayed union of technical capability and political will, and not a dramatic change in
India's security environment.
2. Procurement Diversification, 1978-82
In the aftermath of the 1 97 1 Indo-Pakistani War, India began to search for a new
fighter-bomber aircraft to replace both the indigenous Marut and the Soviet-made SU-7B
jets. The ability of Pakistan to successfully conduct a "lightning strike" deep into India
on 3 December 1971, the inability of India to intercept Pakistani Mirage-3s, and the
difficulty encountered by Indian Canberra bombers on similar deep strike missions into
Pakistan, all pointed towards a gap between Indian and Pakistani air warfare
capabilities. 198 Additionally, India was becoming disenchanted with the Soviet Union
due to a growing surplus in non-convertible Russian rubles 199 and the ability of the
Soviet Union to influence the combat readiness of the Indian military with "spare parts
197 Special thanks to Peter Lavoy for highlighting this action-reaction cycle of
bureaucratic and technical restraint. It has also been argued that it was not until 1972,
when the Purnima research reactor went critical, that India gained the "basic data on
neutron multiplication factors, effectiveness of reflectors, critical mass assembly, and so
on for manufacturing the Pokhran [I] device." P. R. Chari, "Indo-US Relations: Non-
Proliferation Concerns," in Gary K. Bertsch, et al, Engaging India, 6.
198 Raju G. C. Thomas, "Aircraft For the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications
of the Jaguar Decision," Orbis 24, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 88.
199 Salamat Ali, "Buried in Roubles," Far Eastern Economic Review (2 June 1983): 96-
97.
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diplomacy."200 This disharmony between India and its primary arms supplier would
result in two major procurement deals in the late 1970s involving India, France and Great
Britain. While by no means dislodging the Soviet Union from its position as India's
primary arms supplier (see Figure 2.3), the trade agreements would signal an Indian
attempt to lessen dependence on the Soviet military-industrial complex.
L CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO INDIA'S SPACE PROGRAM
During the 1970s and 1980s, India would continue to receive considerable foreign
assistance to its space program. Following the initial aid provided by the United States in
the 1960s, West Germany and France became key technical supporters of India's
"indigenous" space program. France would provide India with crucial data concerning
liquid propulsion and West Germany would become a central clearinghouse for
technological data concerning rocket guidance, the use of composites in rocket
construction, and the testing of rockets.201 The Soviet Union would also assist India by
signing a 1972 agreement that provided Soviet technical assistance in the design and
manufacturing of Indian satellites.202 When India launched its first three satellites, in
April 1975, June 1979 and November 1981, they were all carried aboard Soviet
Intercosmos rockets.203 Finally, just as American technical data assisted in the
200 Raju G. C. Thomas, "Aircraft For the Indian Air Force," 89.
201 Gary Milhollin, 32.
202 Anita Bhatia, 1017.
203 Indian Space Research Organisation Homepage, <http:www.isro.org/old_sat.htm>.
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% of Total
Figure 2.3: SOURCES OF INDIAN FOREIGN PROCUREMENT, 1964-91
Source : Data derived from, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,
1 963- 1 973: 71. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, J 968- J 977: 156.
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, J 972-1982: 98. World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988: 114. World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1991-1992, 134 (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
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development of India's SLV-3, India's first short-range ballistic missile, the Prithvi, has
been reported to be based on the Soviet Scud-B missile.204 Whereas the American Scout
would become the first stage of India's Agni ERBM, the Soviet Scud-B would become the
second stage of the two-stage Agni I.205
In 1980, following the launch of an indigenous Indian space launch vehicle (SLV-
3) that was based on the design of the American Scout missile, the United States, Canada,
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and Great Britain began talks on halting the future
spread of ballistic missile technology.206 In response to this emerging challenge to India's
procurement of foreign missile technology, the Integrated Guided Missile Development
Program (IGMDP) was created by India in 1983. It encompassed India's five primary
missile projects. While Indian officials downplayed Western accusations of Indian IRBM
development, the first chairman of the Indian Space and Research Organisation (ISRO),
Satish Dhawan, provoked Western accusations when he speculated that the SLV-3 could
be converted into an IRBM with a range of 1480 km.207
204 Gary Milhollin, 32.
205 Yademyl Kontrol, 6-7. While India was a receiver of missile technology, it did not
become an exporter of said technology. In 1974, India denied requests by Libya and Iraq
for missile technology. See Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 76.
206 Alexander A. Pikayero, et al. Russia, the U.S. and the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Adelphi Paper 317 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998): 9.
207 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 18.
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J. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AFGHANISTAN AND FOREIGN ARMS
After the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict, the remainder of the 1970s would be a
period of relatively low and balanced military expenditures in the sub-continent.208 India
would, however, rely heavily on the Soviet Union for its military procurement during this
period, with eighty-five percent of its imported procurement being of Soviet origin (see
Figure 2.3). While Indo-Soviet military ties would continue to grow, the historical rift in
Indo-American relations would also persist.
When the Carter Administration took office in 1 977, non-proliferation was one of
its primary foreign policy objectives.209 Within a year, the United States Congress would
pass the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA). This act was enacted in response to
India's use of American-supplied Tarapur reactor fuel to obtain plutonium for the 1 974
PNE test.210 On 20 April 1978, a month after the NNPA was passed, the U. S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) rejected an Indian export license request for seventeen
tons of enriched uranium to be used in the Tarapur reactor.211 When it became public
208 World Armaments and Disarmaments, SIPRI Yearbook: 1982 (Cambridge, MA:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Inc: 1982), 123.
209 Ram R. Subramanian, Nuclear Competition in South Asia and U.S. Policy. Policy
Papers on International Affairs, No. 30 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies,
1987), 5.
210 Shrikant Paranjpe, "American Policy Toward Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in
South Asia: An Indian Perspective," Asian Affairs 16, no. 4 (Winter 1989-90): 189.
211 Ram R. Subramanian, 7. The United States did, however, make arrangements for
France to assume its role of supplier of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel to India after
the final American shipment in 1980. Rodney Jones, et al., 120, footnote 27.
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knowledge in April 1979 that Pakistan was attempting to import enrichment technology,
the United States invoked Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Symington
Amendment) and cut-off all military aid to Pakistan.212
The appearance of a uniform American nonproliferation stance in South Asia
came to halt, however, in December 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan.213 According to Richard Cronin, "Moscow's December 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan caused the United States to subordinate its nuclear dispute with Pakistan to
U.S. policy to oppose Soviet expansion."214 In response to Soviet military actions in
Afghanistan, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established an arms pipeline via the
Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), to the Afghani
Mujahideen freedom fighters.215 To ensure Pakistan's support for American efforts in
Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration announced on 11 June 1981 that the United
212 Shrikant Paranjpe, 189-90. Unlike the Indian nuclear weapons program which is
plutonium-based, Pakistan's nuclear weapons utilize enriched uranium. Between 1974
and 1977, Pakistan smuggled in ultra-centrifuges and established a facility for uranium
enrichment. Additionally, Pakistan acquired "sizeable quantities" of "yellow cake," or
low enriched uranium, from Libya. See Shikant Paranjpe, 188.
213 While India did not publicly denounce the Soviet invasion, private conversations
between Indira Gandhi and Soviet officials highlighted an Indian fear that the Soviet
invasion would create a Sino-American-Pakistani triangle with India in the middle.
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 39.
214 Richard P. Cronin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: U.S. Foreign Policy Considerations,"
Issue Brief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research
Service (13 January 1988): CRS-2.
215 Chris Smith, "The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: A Case Study of South
Asia," in Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security, SIPRJ Yearbook 1995
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 587-88.
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States would waive the restrictions of the Symington Amendment and give Pakistan a
six-year military aid package worth $3.2 billion.216 Included in this military aid package
was the authorization to sell American F-16 fighters to Pakistan. The arrival of the Cold
War at India's doorstep, coupled with the renewed threat of American arms transfers to
Pakistan, would necessitate an escalation in Indian military expenditures and procurement
during the 1980s. India would again attempt to diversify its foreign procurement sources
and to reduce its dependence on Soviet hardware. Despite the political, military and
developmental incentives for diversification, fiscal constraints and Western suspicions
would limit the numbers and types of military hardware made available to India.
1. Diversified Procurement, 1978-91
In 1977, two years before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Indira Gandhi's
Congress party was defeated in national elections. The newly elected Janata government,
under the leadership of Morarji Desai, "considered the Soviet leaning policy of the
previous Congress administration incompatible with the practice of 'genuine' or 'proper'
nonalignment. In weapons acquisition, the new interpretation called for a more balanced
policy between East and West in the purchase of arms or in seeking military and technical
collaboration for the production of arms in India."217 India's desire to diversify its
procurement sources was also motivated by a desire for more advanced Western military
216 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1995), 211.
217 Raju G. C. Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force," 92.
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technology, concerns over the level of Soviet influence on India's military preparedness,
and displeasure regarding the financial impact of the Indo-Soviet military relationship.
A fundamental aspect of Soviet arms transfers to the Third World during the Cold
War was that the Soviet Union obtained influence over the recipient state by retaining
both the ability to produce spare parts for the systems and the technological capacity to
perform intermediate and upper-level maintenance. Financially, the Soviet Union would
make only twenty-five percent of its profit from the sale of an end item. The other
seventy-five percent would be made by providing maintenance and selling spare parts
over the life of the system.218 For India this meant that a major end item purchased from
the Soviet Union, such as a submarine, had to return to Vladivostok shipyards to have
periodic maintenance performed. This resulted in a twenty-five percent reduction in the
operational readiness of India's submarine forces.219 Moreover, there was a concern that
Soviet control over military spare parts could result in a Soviet attempt at "spare parts
diplomacy," such as was performed earlier by the Soviet Union in Egypt.220
Another factor deeply influencing India's desire to diversify its sources of
procurement in the late 1970s was the huge Indian surplus in non-convertible Russian
218
"Soviet and Russian Military Industrial Complex: A Look from Inside," lecture given
by Vitaly Kataev, General Director, Business Center of the Military Industrial Complex,
Russia; at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (13 October 1999).
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rubles.221 Since the first Indo-Soviet barter agreement in 1953, India had exported
domestic products and crops to the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet products and
rubles. The terms of the barter trade agreements stipulated that any account surplus that
India accumulated from non-military trade could not be used to pay for capital goods and
credits accumulated through arms transfers.222 Up through 1971, the Indo-Soviet trade
balance was always in favor of the Soviet Union. After 1971, however, the balance of
trade shifted, and India began to achieve a surplus in trade with the Soviet Union and thus
accumulated rubles. This growing pool of non-convertible rubles, valued at $862.5
million in 1982, became an even greater burden to India as the Soviet Union began to
decrease the importation of certain Indian goods.223 Weighed down by a growing trade
surplus that could only be depleted by purchasing more Soviet goods, but not arms, India
had an economic incentive to look elsewhere to diversify its procurement portfolio.
The first major break that India made in procurement diversification came in
October 1978 when India chose the Anglo-French Jaguar over the Soviet-made MiG-
23.224 An earlier Indian inquiry into Swedish SAAB-37 Wiggens had been denied
because the aircraft contain American-made Pratt & Witney engines.225 The Jaguar
221 Salamat Ali, "Buried In Roubles," Far Eastern Economic Review (2 June 1983): 96.
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contract, worth $2.5 billion, was the largest arms contract to date in India's history.226
Three years later, in 1981, India would diversify its naval procurement and sign a contract
for the purchase of two West German Type- 1500 submarines. In 1982, the final major
foray into Indian procurement diversification came about with a contract to purchase sixty
French Mirage-2000s. While this deal was later reduced to forty aircraft, it signaled a
continued effort by India to look beyond the Soviet Union for military hardware.
2. Soviet Aircraft: Quality versus Quantity
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet hardware had begun to receive less than
flattering reviews during combat operations in Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Kampuchea
and Lebanon.227 Concurrently, Israel's American-made F-16's were making headlines
following a successful Israeli attack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear facility in 1980228 and the
high kill-ratios they achieved in 1983 versus the Soviet-made MiGs in Lebanon.229 The
questionable performance of Soviet-made aircraft during this period would provide India
with an additional incentive to diversify.
226 Ibid., 708.
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3. Self-Reliance and Dual-Use Technology
A long-standing objective of the Indian leadership has been to achieve autonomy
in the country's military procurement and development. Due to India's limited military-
industrial complex, initial aspirations for complete self-sufficiency had been deemed
unobtainable. Instead, a course for Indian self-sufficiency was plotted. Central to Indian
self-sufficiency aspirations were the necessities of ensuring the uninterrupted supply of
spare parts, whether from indigenous sources or a reliable trade partner, and developing
military hardware that was appropriate for the harsh and varied environmental conditions
of the subcontinent.230 During the 1960s and early 1970s, India downplayed the pursuit
of self-reliance and instead focused on the domestic production of foreign military
equipment.231
With the arrival of President Reagan in the White House in 1981, the United
States enacted a policy to create an "opening to India."232 Understanding India's respect
for science and its quest for self-reliance, the United States hoped to engage India with
high-technology. The basic motivations for the Reagan Administration's reevaluation of
America's India policy were to contain the spread of communism, to prevent nuclear
230 Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of India," in, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New
York: Oxford university Press, 1994), 344-45.
231 Raju G. C. Thomas, "U.S. Transfers of 'Dual-Use Technologies to India," Asian
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proliferation and to provide India with strategic autonomy and freedom from Soviet
influence.233
In 1980, India and the United States appeared to be on the verge of their first
major arms deal since the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. Under negotiation was the sale of
two hundred 155mm howitzers and TOW anti-tank weapons. The eventual failure of this
contract would highlight two key aspects of Indo-American military cooperation. The
first was a hesitancy within the Department of Defense to transfer high-technology
equipment to a country that cooperated so closely with the Soviet Union. As the TOW
anti-tank weapons desired by India were to have night targeting sights on them,234 there
was a concern that the technology involved in designing the night sights might leak back
to the Soviet Union. As one government official would comment, "You're trading off
political gains on the one hand for possible technological compromises on the other."235
Following the signing of an Indo-American Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in
May 1985, the United States would in fact transfer classified data on night gunsights to
India, even though India did not sign a General Security of Military Information
Agreement.236
233 Ibid. Reagan's "opening" policy was facilitated by Indira Gandhi's falling out with
Moscow in the early 1980s. See Steve Patten, "India Pulling Away From Russia?" U.S.
News and World Report (15 February 1982): 25.
234 Dilip Mukerjee, 603.
235 Molly Moore, "High-Tech Arms Sales Arouse Concerns," The Washington Post (6
December 1986): A20.
236 Dilip Mukerjee, 607.
73
The second key aspect of Indo-American military cooperation in the 1 980s was
the American willingness to slowly transfer technological information, while blocking the
transfer of military end-items.237 Among the items that the United States would transfer
to India during the 1980s were General Electric F-404 jet engines and General Electric
LM2500 marine engines. The F-404s were the same engines used in American F-18s,
and they were destined for India's indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program.238
The LM2500 engines were used on American Spruance-class destroyers, and they were
intended for an upgrade of Indian frigates.239 While these transfers were of obvious
importance to India, the United States would still place a limit on the transfer of its
technology. Most notable was the decision to cancel the transfer of the Cray XMP-24
supercomputer, capable of aiding India in the advancement of its missile and nuclear
weapons programs as well as in cracking codes, and to replace the computer with a less
advanced Cray XMP-14, which would still satisfy India's stated need for weather-
forecasting.240
While India reduced its importation of Soviet military hardware by sixteen percent
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s (see Figure 2.3, page 64), it was still
economically impossible to cut the Soviet military supply-line. By the mid-1980s, India
237 Ibid., 611.
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again began to increase its contracts for Soviet military hardware. Among the primary
reasons for continued Soviet dominance in Indian foreign procurement were the lower
initial costs and the willingness of the Soviet Union to agree to licensing for the
production of said systems in India.241 In 1985, India and the Soviet Union would sign
licensing contracts for the production of 200 MiG-27s and 1,000 T-72s in India.242 The
T-72 was reported to cost one-third the price of its Western equivalent, and Soviet aircraft
on average would cost about one-half of their Western peers. Again, from the Soviet
perspective, the profit in arms transfers remained in the long-term costs of maintenance
and spare parts.243
During the Cold War, India would be the only non-socialist country to receive
arms production technology from the Soviet Union.244 While New Delhi wished to
remain independent of Soviet influence, economics and U.S. ambivalence would force
India to remain reliant on the Soviet Union. As one Indian official remarked, "We haven't
241 Salamat Ali, "Cheap, But at a Price," 35.
242 World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1985 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 415.
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gone to the Russians as a matter of choice. Their stuff is damn cheap, and the U.S. made
it impossible for us to do otherwise."245
K. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COLD WAR YEARS
The pattern of Indian military procurement during the period 1947 to 1990
highlights three central themes of this study. The first is the fragile nature of the Indo-
Soviet "special" relationship. The second theme is the emergence and growth of the
Indo-American divide. The final theme is the evolution of India's strategic culture and its
role in procurement decisions. A summary of these three topics is provided below.
1. Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation
The history of Indo-Soviet military cooperation can be summarized as a
relationship determined by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism and Western ambivalence.
When India commenced the rapid modernization of its armed forces following the 1 962
Sino-Indian conflict, its initial objective was to continue and expand upon its historical
Western supply-line. After failing to secure arms transfer agreements with the West,
India turned to the Soviet Union out of "dire necessity." For India, the agreement was a
commercial one based on economics. Soviet military contracts usually had favorable
financial terms and included provisions for production licensing. But in the long-run,
these deals became a burden as India failed to secure a reliable supply of spare parts and
245 Cited in, June Kronholz, "Is India's Romance With Russia Losing Its Thrill?" The
Wall Street Journal ( 1 4 June 1 982): 2 1
.
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also experienced a drop in operational readiness due to a void in indigenous maintenance
capabilities.
When India made a concerted effort in the 1980s to diversify its procurement
portfolio, it found itself returning to the Soviet Union to satisfy its short-term military
needs. With a long-term goal of self-reliance in military procurement, India would
continue to use Soviet arms as a stepping stone between the bygone era of the British Raj
and future Indian procurement autonomy. While Soviet arms would be used to offset
American influence in South Asia, they did not pose a direct military threat to American
forces during this period.
2. The Indo-American Rift
Central to the discussion of Indo-American relations during the Cold War is the
fact that India did not play a vital role in American geo-strategic thinking during this
period. The ideological significance of India as the world's largest democracy was
negated by India's unwillingness to align itself with the West in the pivotal East-West
struggle. From the American perspective, a lack of Indian support versus the "communist
threat" equated to Indian hostility. India's quest for diplomatic independence and self-
reliance did not fit into the American paradigm for a bipolar world.
From the Indian perspective, the confrontational American style threatened a
return to colonial methods and subservience. In Indian eyes, America's willingness to
engage Pakistan and China, and thereby impair India's regional security, illuminated
American hegemonic aspirations and American indifference towards less developed
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countries. The unwillingness of the United States to provide arms to a fellow democracy
when needed seemed hypocritical and incredible. The essence of the Indo-American
"problem" was quite clear. Both states were acting in the same manner and securing their
own national needs, with little regard for what other states might desire. The United
States believed that as a superpower it had the right to take a superior position. India felt
that as the world's largest democracy, and a victim of centuries of repression, it had the
right to demand equality. With both states proceeding forward and neither willing to give
way to the other, a collision was imminent.
3. Indian Strategic Culture
History, geography and political culture all played crucial roles in the
development of India's conventional forces and nuclear capabilities during the Cold War.
India's sudden emancipation in 1947 after centuries of subservience created "a fierce
determination to preserve Indian independence no matter what the cost - an attitude often
bordering on paranoia."246 Any attempt by outside powers, whether Soviet or Western,
to exert influence upon India was often met with open defiance. While the Soviet Union,
especially under Khrushchev, would be more understanding of India's "paranoia" and
would treat India with respect, the United States often presented India with demands,
even when providing food aid. Furthermore, the United States would exacerbate India's
246 Ashley J. Tellis, India: Assessing Strategy and Military Capabilities in the Year 2000
(Santa Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation, 1996), 12.
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geographic isolation by providing arms and technical data to both Pakistan and China,
thus adding fuel to Indian militarism.
Finally, India's political and bureaucratic leaders were crucial in determining the
course that India would take in weapons development and procurement. Nehru neglected
the country's military forces until it was too late to recover. Shastri provided the green
signal to Bhabha, who manipulated the emerging Chinese threat skillfully. When
Sarabhai replaced Bhabha in crucial posts within India's atomic energy program, pursuit
of the nuclear option was neglected. Indira Gandhi preferred cooperation with the Soviet
Union during her first premiership (1966-1977), then became more pro-Western during
her second term (1980-1984). Desai understood the limitations of a single-track
procurement source and set the course for diversified procurement. While all these
individuals had the will to shape and direct India's weapons programs, their hands were
often tied by financial, technical and diplomatic constraints. When these bonds began to
loosen in the post-Cold War era, the influence and role of India's political culture would
become even more decisive.
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III. NEW DYNAMICS AND CONTINUITIES: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
India is becoming a harder, more selfish and pragmatic entity. No longer
encumbered by leaders besotted by larger-than-life images of themselves
on the international stage, the new India is inclined to look at the world in
terms of its own interests.247
The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War brought
about a drastic change in India's geo-strategic and diplomatic importance. At the same
time, India experienced internal economic turmoil and an increase in domestic instability
due to numerous insurgency movements. These factors contributed to a sharp decrease in
Indian military expenditures and arms importation. Furthermore, a rigid American
approach to India, centered on nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of
Indo-American relations and prevent a broadening of these relations. Finally, the
foundations of the Indo-Soviet/Russian military relationship would shift from Indian
needs and Soviet opportunism to Russian economic needs and Indian military needs and
opportunism. This chapter encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War up
through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period represents an opportunity lost for
American security interests in South Asia as Russian influence was allowed to remain
while Indian suspicions of American intentions were continually validated.
247 Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role. Adelphi Paper 293 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 66.
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A. INDIA'S POST-COLD WAR IDENTITY
Having defined its identity and prestige in international politics as the leader of
the Non-Aligned Movement, India's raison d'etre and identity in international relations
became uncertain with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. "The pursuit of
autonomy without power was premised, first, on a balanced stalemate between the
Atlantic and Soviet blocs..."248 The removal of the "Soviet bloc" from the "stalemate"
effectively ended the stalemate and, consequently, the rationale for the non-aligned
movement. Indians also came to realize that the absence of a bilateral competition
between the two superpowers meant that India's geo-strategic role as a "counter-weight"
no longer existed. "When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, India
found that few people outside the region cared much about the country. India neither had
economic influence nor risked becoming a major source of instability - the two most
important criteria for earning foreign attention."249 Furthermore, the rise of secessionist
movements throughout India, South Asia and Central Asia shifted Indian defense
concerns back to the issue of internal stability. Finally, after three decades of
protectionist economic policies, India was forced to abandon its Soviet-supported
248 Gopal Krishna, "India and the International Order - Retreat From Idealism," in,
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ed., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), 283.
249 James Manor and Gerald Segal, "Taking India Seriously," Survival 40, no. 2 (Summer
1998): 63.
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"fortress mentality" and turn to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for
economic rejuvenation.250
Aiding the collapse of the Indian "fortress" was a realization among Indian elites
that other Asian countries were experiencing rapid economic growth via the global
market. 251 It was during this transition period of the early 1990s that India emerged from
centuries of subservience to (or, during the Cold War, dependence on) external powers to
begin defining a global role for itself that was solely egocentric and not centered on
India's reliance on other states. On the strategic level, to rephrase Ashley Tellis' Cold
War depiction of India, the post-Cold War era became a time of transition as India
evolved from being a consumer of security to being a producer of its own security.252
B. INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
In the early 1990s, economic reforms in India and the end of the East-West
competition of the Cold War provided an opportunity for improved Indo-American
relations. Many observers hoped that the continued growth in Indo-American trade
relations would provide a "cornerstone" for improved relations.253 As a result of India's
Economic Reform Programme, foreign investment in India had risen sharply, with the
250 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "India in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs 73, no.
2 (April 1997): 301-02.
251 James Manor and Gerald Segal, 63.
252 Ashley J. Tellis, 2.
253 M. J. Vinod, "India-United States Relations in a Changing World: Challenges and
Opportunites," Strategic Analysis 20, no. 3 (July 1997): 442.
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United States taking the lead as India's largest foreign investor.254 Additionally, the
United States became a major source of technology for India.255
Against this backdrop of opportunity, however, the legacy of the Cold War Indo-
American rift persisted. During the 1990-91 Gulf War, India had silently allowed
American cargo aircraft transiting from the Philippines to the Gulf States to refuel at
several airports. When an Indian press photographer happened upon an American aircraft
in Bombay that was delayed due to maintenance problems, the story exploded into the
Indian press.256 Domestic politics elevated the refueling operations into a breech of
India's nonalignment policies, and the new Indian Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar, was
forced to halt the operations.
Following the Gulf War, however, Indo-American military cooperation improved
as the two nations conducted a joint naval exercise in 1992 and signed a pact on military
cooperation in 1995.257 Additionally, the United States continued to provide technical
support to India's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program and also authorized the transfer
254 P.R. Rajeswari, "From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics: Indo-US Experience,"
Strategic Analysis 21, no. 8 (November 1997). Available online: <http://www.idsa-
india.org/an-nov-4.html>.
255 Ibid., page 6 of 11.
256 Dennis Kux, 440.
257 John F. Burns, "U.S.-India Pact on Military Cooperation," The New York Times (13
January 1995): A 12.
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of 315 Texas Instruments Paveway bomb-guidance kits to the Indian Air Force.258
Despite these efforts, Indo-American relations continued to flounder.
During the first term of the Clinton Administration, the United States adopted
foreign policy goals in South Asia based upon human rights issues, the desire to resolve
tensions in Kashmir, and the need to "cap, roll-back and eliminate'' nuclear weapons in
the region.259 As the Clinton Administration continued into its second term, there
appeared to be no attempt to readdress Indo-American relations. "One third of the
Clinton Administration saw India in terms of arms control, one third saw it as an
economic opportunity and one third saw it as a possible strategic partner. There was no
policy review, no attempt to bring all this together."260 Additionally, in 1995, the U.S.
Congress passed the Brown Amendment, which lifted most of the sanctions dictated by
the Pressler Amendment and allowed the sale of $658 million worth of military
equipment to Pakistan. 261 Finally, the United States chose not to impose sanctions on
China for the transfer to Pakistan of M-l 1 missiles and parts and 5,000 ring magnets for
258 Eric Arnett, "Nuclear Stability and Arms Sales to India: Implications for U.S. Policy,"
Arms Control Today 27, no. 5 (August 1997): 9.
259
"U.S. Policy Toward South Asia," Dispatch 6, no. 13 (27 March 1995). Published by
the Bureau of Public Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. P. M. Kamath, "Indo-US
Relations During the Clinton Administration: Upward Trends and Uphill Tasks Ahead,"
Strategic Analysis 21, no. 11 (February 1998): 1604.
260 Ainslie Embree and Stephen P. Cohen cited in Barbara Crossette, "From Guru to
Rogue: American Re-examines India," The New York Times (17 May 1998): A4.
261 Virginia Foran, "The Case for Indo-US High-Technology Cooperation," Survival 40,
no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 84.
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Pakistan's unsafeguarded centrifuges.262 From the Indian perspective, in the early post-
Cold War years, the United States continued to show a preference towards Pakistan and
China while simultaneously infringing upon Indian sovereignty.
C. RUSSIA'S POST-COLD WAR VIEW OF INDIA
Unable to stabilize its own domestic environment, Russia's leadership,
specifically President Boris Yeltsin, emphasized a need for the "'de-ideologization' of its
foreign policy."263 This "de-ideologization" policy resulted in Russia adopting a "wait
and see" policy towards India. 264 "The main thing was that Moscow wanted its policy
towards India to be pragmatic and flexible."265 Perhaps the greatest source of Russian
neutrality towards India during the transition period of the early 1 990s was a Russian
political leadership that was "dominated by 'Westerners' and the 'Atlanticists.'"266
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin both appeared to rest their hopes for a rejuvenation
of the Russian economy on some variant of the Marshall Plan.267 Both men failed to
understand that a Marshall Plan scenario - at least in the variation pursued in West
Germany - required not only defeat but also an occupation of the targeted state to ensure
262 Virginia Foran, 84.
263 Anita Inder Singh, "A New Indo-Russian Connection," International Affairs 71, no. 1
(January 1995): 70.
264 Ibid.
265 Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," page 4 of 18.
266 Ibid., page 1 of 18.
267 Ibid.
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that the required infrastructure and "rule of law" were in place. As is well documented,
the tremendous amount of corruption and disorganization within Russia's bureaucracy
curtailed the potential effectiveness of Western financial assistance.
The foreign policy struggle between the "Westerners" and "Asia first" groups in
the new Russian state placed Indo-Russian relations in a precarious position. Two
schools of thought concerning India existed within Russia in the early 1990s. The first
school was composed of academics, members of the Duma and the defense industry who
believed that Russia should maintain its "special" relationship with India.268 A strong
India, they argued, could help fight the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that was
sweeping across the Central Asian region between Russia and India. Additionally, this
group believed that a strong India could offset the hegemonic status of the United States.
If Russia promoted areas of regional strength throughout the globe, this school believed,
the United States' ability to rest upon its post-Cold War laurels would be short-lived.269
Finally, India was the top importer of Soviet armaments during the final years of the Cold
War, and many experts in Russia believed that this income source was crucial in Russia's
transition to a free-market economy.270
The second Russian school of thought concerning future relations with India was
headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. This group believed that Pakistani
268 The crucial role of Russian interest groups is discussed below.
269 Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," page 2-3 of 18.
270 Ibid. Yuri Maslyukov, "Russia's Future Lies With The Defense Industry," Military
Parade (July-August 1998).
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relations were more valuable in fulfilling Russia's immediate foreign policy and security
concerns. The southern periphery of Russia was a hotbed for Islamic fundamentalism and
Pakistan held the necessary credentials to be an effective middleman for Russia. This
view obviously countered the pro-India school that believed the solution to the growing
Islamic threat was a strong Indian counter-balance. Finally, the Russian Foreign Ministry
considered Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as having a higher priority than India due to their
geographic proximity to Russia.271
As the transition from Soviet to Russian rule took place, the anti-India school of
thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making. This domination resulted in a major
shift in Soviet/Russian policy towards South Asia. "In November 1991, when the Soviet
Union was breathing its last, in a dramatic change of policy, Moscow suddenly supported
the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free
zone in South Asia to the great consternation of New Delhi."272 A nuclear-free zone
would mean that both India and Pakistan would discontinue their nuclear programs and
become "equals" as non-nuclear states. The signal sent by the collapsing Soviet regime,
with many of its leaders taking positions in the new Russian government, was that it sided
with the West and Pakistan against India's ambitions for regional leadership and security.
271 Shubha Singh, "There Has Been An Improvement in Indo-Russian Bilateral Trade in
The Past Year," The Pioneer (24 December 1998): 9. FBIS Document ID:
FTS 1998 1224000277. Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," page 2 of
18.
272 Jyotsna Bakshi, "Russia's Post-Pokhran Dilemma," Strategic Analysis 22, no. 5
(August 1998): 721. Available online: <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-4.html>.
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A second impetus for Soviet/Russian support of the Pakistani-sponsored
resolution may have been the strong desire to put closure to the war in Afghanistan. To
accomplish this, the Soviet/Russian leadership wanted to "secure the release of their
prisoners of war who were in the custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen
factions."273 In January 1992, one month after a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen
traveled to Russia, Moscow severed all "military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military
transport" that were sustaining the Najib government's war effort against the Mujihadeen.
This decision effectively negated the airpower advantage that the Najib government had
held over the Mujihadeen and tilted the conflict back in favor of the insurgents. New
Delhi felt a certain sense of betrayal because of the reversal in Soviet policy since the
Indian government had worked with the Soviet Union in supporting the nationalist and
secular Najib government.274
D. STRAINED INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives that the
post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further strained by two events.
The first of these destabilizing events centered around a contract dispute between the
Russian space directorate "Glavkosmos" and the government of India for the purchase of
cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 1 8 January 1 99 1
,
stemmed from India's desire to gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of
273 Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," page 3 of 18.
274 Ibid., 3-4 of 18.
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Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India's geo-synchronous satellite launch
vehicle (GSLV) program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the
project was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational.275 For
Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide crucial funds during a period of
tremendous reductions in Russian defense expenditures.276
Over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer of
missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the April 1987
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of missile
proliferation became well known to the United States following the Iraqi Scud missile
attacks during the Gulf War277 and the testing of India's Agni IRBM missile in 1989.
However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the sale was hampered by
the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet Union collapsed and as the U.S.
Executive Branch changed administrations from President Bush to President Clinton.278
From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine deal was legal
under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of "peaceful
275 Alexander A. Pikayeo, et al., Russia, the US and the Missile Technology Control
Regime, Adelphi Paper 317, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford





space ventures."279 Furthermore, India asserted that U.S. attempts to block the sale were
financially motivated since General Dynamics and the French space-booster manufacturer
Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.280
The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India's leadership
that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. This promise was compromised,
however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992,281 and threatened further
economic measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transaction
and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the cryogenic engines and not the
technology.282 In exchange, Glavkosmos was given bidding rights on over $950 million
worth of future U.S. space projects.283
While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and ICBMs was
delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the original cryogenic engine deal, the
279 Anita Inder Singh, 73.
280 Alexander A. Pikayev, et al. 22-23.
281 The authority for the United States to apply sanctions was vested in the 1991 Missile
Technology Control Act (MTCA). See Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of
India," in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook 1994
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 358.
282 Despite this pledge not to transfer technology, fifteen Indian scientists continued to
train at Glavkosmos through 1994. See Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of
India," 359. Moreover, by the time that Yeltsin "corrected" the cryogenic contract with
India, 85% of all the technological documents had already been transferred to India. See
Gennadiy Khromov, "A View of India's Policy on Missile and Nuclear
Nonproliferation," Yadernyy Kontrol 41, no. 5 (Sep-Oct 1998). Translated by FBIS.
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main concern in New Delhi was that the Yeltsin government had given in to Western
pressure. "'The conclusion they drew was that Russia's overriding need for American
economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure. In Indian eyes, Russia is
unreliable, and it has also lost its international stature."284 As Indo-Russian relations
appeared to weaken under Western pressure, direct bilateral interactions between the two
states also revealed tensions.
During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, the "rupee versus
ruble" debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As the Cold War concluded, India had
an amassed debt of $12-16 billion owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While
India proved willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged between the two states over the
nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be used. As noted earlier, the
Soviet Union had been willing to accept rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial
Soviet intent in the military cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance,
not a financial pool. Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports in the Soviet
Union, almost half of the rupee-based debt remained in Indian banks uncollected.285
When the new and financially strapped Russian state took over the old Soviet trade
books, the vast Indian debt became an issue of concern. "Goodwill alone cannot forge
mutually advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost collapsed
in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble exchange rate and the amount
284 Anita Inder Singh, 74.
285 Ibid., 75.
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India owed Russia as the successor state to the USSR."286 After much domestic
squabbling in each country, a resolution was reached in January 1 993 that called for India
to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005, after which the remaining
thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest free, over forty-five years.287
Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy over distribution of
the "Rupee Fund" continued. Russia had originally agreed to establish a three-year
import schedule with India which would allow Indian exporters to forecast the amount of
products needed in advance. In September 1994, the Russian government reversed this
decision out of fear that long-term financial commitments would be too constricting. The
new plan offered by Moscow provided a 180-day export forecast to Indian producers.288
To further stimulate investor interest in India's currency, the Russian government
began to auction off vast sums of the Indian currency to Russian importers at discounted
rates. The average discount of fifteen percent during the auctions led to rampant
corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially among Russia's banking
oligarchy.289 Meanwhile, the Indian government continued to petition Russia to
accelerate the repayment schedule while it simultaneously maintained its protectionist
286 Anita Inder Singh.
287 Ibid., 76. "Interfax Financial Report For 26 November 1998," Moscow Interfax (26
November 1998). Available from FBIS. Document ID: FTS19981 126001 140. "India,
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import-export policies.290 By 1993, the level of bilateral trade between India and Russia
had dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5 billion. 291
India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in January 1996, when
Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia's Foreign
Minister.292 The result was an immediate swing in Russia's foreign policy focus that
included considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. A clear signal
was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, one year later when an
agreement was reached to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India
in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban.293 "The two countries signed an accord
paving the way for the construction of two 1 ,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at
Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it seems that Russia would not succumb to external
pressure this time."294 Diplomatically, Russia appeared to no longer look strictly
westwards.
290 Arun Mohanty.
291 Sujata Rao, "India, Russia Repair Trade Ties," The Moscow Times (12 February
1997).
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E. INDIA'S MILITARY NEEDS AND RUSSIA'S SUPPLIER-DEPENDENCY
The primary short-term military concern for India in the early 1990s was its
limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet-produced armaments.295 After
three decades of reliance on Soviet-produced hardware, India was in a position in 1991 in
which seventy percent of Army armaments, eighty percent of Air Force armaments, and
eight-five percent of Navy armaments were of Soviet origin.296 Lacking the indigenous
capability to produce spare parts and supplies for these systems, India's military faced an
immediate crisis. The break-up of the Soviet Union had caused a fracture in the Soviet-
Indian military supply-line as the administrative control and actual locations of the Soviet
defense industries were situated throughout the newly independent states. 'As Air Vice-
Marshall S. Krishnaswamy noted with some understatement, there was a 'hiccup' in
supply relations during 1991-92."297 Over-reliance on Soviet military hardware had
allowed India to postpone developing a self-reliant indigenous defense industry. More to
Partnership," The Pioneer (10 September 1998): 10. FBIS Document Number: FBIS-
NES-98-253. Russia was most likely motivated also by a desire to "secure resources to
pay the salaries of MTNATOM employees, maintain work at the nuclear design bureaus
and production facilities, and provide fresh momentum to the development of the
domestic nuclear industry in general." Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, 249-50.
295 Anita Inder Singh, 74.
296 Yuriy Golotyuk, "Russia and India are experiencing a 'Military-Technical
Renaissance,'" Segodnya (27 March 1996): 2. Translated by FBIS. Document Number:
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the point, "the dependence on Russian weapons over 30 years was a serious strategic
defect."2^
In response to its economic crisis in 1 990-9 1 and the temporary loss of its primary
foreign arms supplier, India imposed a reduction in defense expenditures and a sharp
reduction in arms importation (see Figures3.1 and 3.2 below). After having been the top
%
Figure 3.1: Indian Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1988-96
Source: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRJ Yearbook
1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 230.
298 Yuriy Golotyuk, 2.
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Figure 3.2: Indian Arms Imports in Constant 1996 U.S dollars.
Source: Data obtained from, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1997
(Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998), Table II. Available
online: <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/wmeat97/vvTneat97.pdf>.
importer of conventional weapons in the world during the period from 1988 to 1992,299
India was ranked as the twenty-third largest importer of conventional arms by 1996.300
Meanwhile, Russia's share of the global arms market dropped from thirty-two percent in
299 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 344.
300 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998), 100.
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1989 to eight percent in 1994. 301 The inability of Russia to continue the Soviet flow of
military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in Indian military expenditures,
weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of Indian Arms Imported from the Soviet Union/Russia
Source: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook 1996
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 482. Table 1 1.8.
F. THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN INTEREST GROUPS
Until the communist collapse, the Indo-Soviet relationship prospered
because of the need for a balance against the West, and shared security and
geopolitical concerns. The new Indo-Russian relationship will have to be
based primarily on business interests, and colored only marginally by
geopolitics and security.302
By the mid- 1 990s, however, the recovery of the Indian economy and the financial
needs of Russia's military-industrial complex quickly mended the temporary "hiccup" in
Indo-Russian military cooperation. In 1995, the sale of Russian arms on the international
301 Deepa M. Ollapally, "India and the New 'Asian' Balance of Power," Strategic
Analysis 22, no. 4 (July 1998): 516.
302 Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role. Adelphi Paper 293 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 62.
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market increased by sixty percent over the previous year's total as the state shifted from
"an ideological to a market-driven approach to selling its military hardware."303 Along
with this shift in Russian arms sales practices came the decisive influence of Russian
interest groups.304 During the Cold War, decisions to sell Soviet weaponry abroad had
been made by the Politburo. But in the post-Cold War era, the choice of where and when
to sell Russian arms rested with the power-brokers of the Russian military-industrial
complex.305 As Vitaly Kataev, the General Director of Russia's Center of Military
Industrial Complex, remarked, "Economics dictate the routes of trade."306
The likelihood of Russian interest groups dictating future military cooperation
with India appears high. India buys more hardware from the Russian defense industry
than Russia's own military forces.307 Estimates show that about eight hundred Russian
defense production facilities are kept in operation by Indian defense contracts.308 Russian
303 Anton Zhigulsky, "Russia's Arms Sales Rose 60% in 1995," The Moscow Times (05
January 1996).
304 A detailed analysis of the influence of Russian interest groups has been conducted by
Stephen De Spiegeleire of the Rand Corporation. These papers can be accessed at:
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sdspieg. Of particular relevance to this
study are the findings that rank Russia's military-industrial complex as the second most
influential interest group in Russia after the gas-oil industry.
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exports to China and India amount to about forty-one percent of the total revenue brought
in by Russia's defense industry.309 The signing of a ten-year Indo-Russian agreement on
military-technical cooperation, worth $15 billion, in the aftermath of the Pokhran II tests
is an example of this trend. 310 "In this sense it can be assumed that at the very least up to
2010, when aging begins of the most advanced Russian models already existing (SU-
30MK and SU-35/37, T-90S tank, Mi-28 and Ka-50/52 attack helicopters), Russia can
count on preserving a stable Indian demand for relatively large lots of arms and for their
manufacturing technology."311
Outside the paradigm of arms sales, several trends are emerging that may promote
strong Indo-Russia cooperation. The first is a common security interest as both countries
have strong concerns about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the potential Chinese
threat, and the prospect of U.S. world hegemony. 312 "In private discussions Russian and
Indian diplomats willingly open the cards: both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in
309 Ibid., 244.
310
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the excessive strengthening of China and the Islamic extremists."313 Furthermore, by
promoting the rise of Indian power, Russia may be able to offset the "heat of NATO's
eastward extension."314 There also remains a school of thought that Russia may be able
to learn from India some lessons for sustaining a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic democratic
state. Finally, both states face an increasing criminal threat centered around narcotics and
illegal arms smuggling.315
G. 11 MAY 1998: POKHRAN II
The current disharmony, therefore, between India and the rest of the globe
is that India has moved from being totally moralistic to being a little more
realistic, while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear
conclusions entirely realistically. With a surplus of nuclear weapons and
the technology for fourth-generation weapons, the other nuclear powers
are now beginning to move towards a moralistic position. Here is the
cradle of lack of understanding about the Indian stand.
-Jaswant Singh316
A decisive turn was made along the historical path of India's nuclear program
when the Rajastan desert was rocked by three nuclear explosions on 1 1 May 1998. This
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(August 1998): 721. Available online: <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-4.html>.
314 Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking," page 15 of 18.
315 Lowell Bezanis, "An Enlarged Golden Crescent," Transitions 2, no. 19 (20 September
1996). Aleksandr Shumilin; and Jyotsna Bakshi, "India in Russia's Strategic Thinking,"
p. 12 of 18.
316 Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," Foreign Affairs 11, no. 5
(September/October 1998): 47. The term "shakti" can be translated to "strength,"
"force," or "power." It is quite revealing that the code name assigned to India's nuclear
tests in May, 1998, was Operation Shakti.
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decision to overtly weaponize after twenty-four years of "restraint" has been the subject
of much scrutiny in nonproliferation studies. The reasons normally highlighted as
possible catalysts include: technological considerations, in that India needed to update
the limited test data acquired in the 1974 test to allow supercomputer simulations for
designing future warheads; security concerns, in that the recent testing of Pakistan's
ERBM Ghauri missile and increasing Sino-Pakistani military cooperation reduced India's
geo-strategic buffer zone; normative factors; in that nuclear weapons remain a symbol of
international power;317 and domestic politics, in that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had
recently become the major party in the ruling Indian coalition after an election campaign
which included an open promise to make India a nuclear power.318 Of these four
rationales for India's 1998 tests, the normative and domestic politics motivations appear
most salient when subjected to close scrutiny.319
317 Russia had increased its reliance on nuclear deterrence to compensate for crumbling
conventional forces. Additionally, Gen. Sundarji, the former Indian army chief of staff,
pointed at the recent defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War and stated that the true lesson of the
war was that one should not fight the United States unless one possessed nuclear
weapons. See Mario E. Carranza, "An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence
After the Indian And Pakistani Tests," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer
1999): 14.
318
"The nuclearization of India has been an article of faith for the BJP." Manoj Joshi,
"Nuclear Shock Wave," India Today (25 May 1998). Available on-line: http://www.
india-today.com/itoday/2505 1 998/cover.html.
319 While it has been reported that India retrieved no data from the 1974 PNE due to the
destruction of all the test gear' in the shaft, the sudden decision to acquire new data after
twenty-four years is not in and of itself sufficient to explain the test. Concerning a
"strategic" incentive, Pakistan's testing of a Ghauri missile does not address why the BJP
initially gave authorization to test in 1996, but was removed from power within thirteen
days. Additionally, the fact that the Defense Minister was not informed of the impending
102
H. POST-COLD WAR TRENDS: A BALANCE A SHEET
In the post-Cold War era, several definitive trends have emerged that do not bode
well for American security interests in South Asia. India and the United States have
allowed Cold War differences to persist untreated. These differences have consequently
festered into a "we-versus-they" dialogue that promotes conflict rather than cooperation.
While the decision to conduct the Pokhran II tests was motivated only partially by
sentiments against American unilateralism, the effect has been a widening gap in Indo-
American ties.
Furthermore, the revival of Indo-Russian military ties, driven by economic factors,
has placed the United States in a quandary in which the Indo-Russian connection can only
be severed by counter-offers of third-party arms320 or the slow but eventual emergence of
Indian self-sufficiency. These options are long-term in nature and cannot offset India's
short-term dependence on its Soviet-era military systems. Moreover, the likelihood of the
United States authorizing the sale of high-technology arms to India after years of
nonproliferation-centric diplomacy is minimal.
Pokhran II tests until two days prior, while the service chiefs were not informed until one
day prior, suggests that the May 1998 tests were conducted outside of a civil-military
strategic dialogue. See Manoj Joshi, 2. The "strategic" argument should also be
examined closely in light of the fact that the decision to test was made prior to India
performing a much-heralded Strategic Defense Review. See George Perkovich, "India
Errs," Newsday (15 May 1998): A57.
320 India has in fact turned to France and other states to purchase aircraft and military
hardware. These acquisitions, however, will only partially offset the dominance of
Russian arms sales. See, Rahul Bedi: "India Seeks Mirage 2000 Nuclear Squadron," The
Asian Age (29 Aug 99), Atul Aneja, "Arms Purchases Being Finalised," The Hindu (04
September 1999).
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Finally, the most recent developments in Indian strategic culture have rejuvenated
India's quest for global status and equity. The rise of the BJP has resulted in a new
approach to international nuclear politics in New Delhi. India has played its nuclear card
in the hope of receiving international power status. Having based Indian nationalism on
the image of nuclear strength, it is unlikely that India will unilaterally rollback its
program.
The final chapter addresses the security implications of these post-Cold War
developments for the United States.
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IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS
Civilization clash is not so much over Jesus Christ, Confucius, or the
Prophet Mohammed as it is over the unequal distribution of world power,
wealth and influence, and the perceived lack of respect accorded to small
states and peoples by larger ones. Culture is the vehicle for expression of
conflict, not its cause.321
Although it has become fashionable to argue that economic strength, not
military might, is now the international currency of power, neither the
patterns of post-cold war military expenditure and arms development nor
the primacy of muscle and force in international relations supports that
thesis... India has learned the hard way that a unilateral desire for peace
cannot bring about peace. A country can enjoy peace only if it can defend
peace.322
The above statements highlight the crucial contradiction that currently exists
between Western nonproliferation goals in South Asia and Indian nuclear aspirations.
While foreign and domestic critics of India's nuclear program have argued that the direct
costs and opportunity costs associated with developing a nuclear deterrent are too high for
an economically strapped nation such as India to undertake,323 the statement by Brahma
321 Graham Fuller, "The Next Ideology," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (Spring 1995): 153-54,
cited in, Satish Kumar, "The Post-Cold War International Perspective: An Indian
Perspective," Strategic Analysis 21, no. 6 (September 1997). Available online:
<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-sep-2.html>.
322 Brahma Chellaney, "The Defence of India," The Hindustan Times (20 October 1999).
Available Online: http://www.hindustantimes.com>.
323 See Peter R. Lavoy, "The Costs ofNuclear Weapons in South Asia." U.S. Information
Agency (September 1999). Available online: <http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0999/
ijpe/pj291avo.htm>, and M. V. Ramana, "A Recipe For Disaster," The Hindu (09
September 1999). Available online: <http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1999/09/09/
stories/05092523.htm>.
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Chellaney, one of the creators of India's new draft nuclear doctrine, asserts that economic
concerns are secondary to the strategic and normative advantages afforded to India by the
acquisition of nuclear arms. These polar views result in a "chicken or the egg scenario"
in which one side argues that economic strength and stability are a prerequisite to modern
global power and the other side argues that modern global power, symbolized by nuclear
strength, provides security and can open the door to future economic growth. In this
scenario, the resilience of the Indian view is amplified by a strategic culture that exudes
suspicion towards Western motives as well as a deep drive towards decision-making free
from external pressures.
This chapter explores three crucial topics surrounding the current nonproliferation
standoff between the United States and India. The first is an analysis of the most likely
path that India will pursue in the development of its nuclear deterrent. Enmeshed in this
discussion is the role of Russia, and other foreign suppliers, in assisting the creation of a
"credible" Indian nuclear triad. The second topic discusses the extent to which India's
nuclear program is a direct threat to American security interests. This discussion includes
both the global implications for American nonproliferation efforts and the hypothetical
existence of a direct military threat to American power projection in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, the third topic explores future policy options for the United States in India
specifically, and South Asia in general.
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A. INDIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FUTURE NUCLEAR
EXPANSION
In the preceding discussion of the parallels between India's strategic culture and
the development of its nuclear weapons program, the key aspect of the "green signals" of
1948, 1964, 1974 and 1998 is that they all symbolize an Indian stair-stepping approach to
the creation of a nuclear arsenal. From the Indian perspective, which is crucial to
understand in a nonproliferation framework, the Indian nuclear weapons program has
demonstrated fifty-one years of "restraint."324 This Indian perspective is well
encapsulated by a policy paper delivered by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee two weeks
after the Pokhran III tests.
Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. Restraint,
however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or
doubt. Restraint is valid only when doubts are removed. The series of
tests undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts.325
The argument about a "restrained" Indian nuclear weapons program is not meant
to discount the motives of many members of the Indian "bomb-lobby." As mentioned
above, strategic concerns, domestic politics and international norms have all played
crucial roles in the growth of the Indian bomb program. Homi Bhabha utilized the
strategic fears created by the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 to obtain authorization to
324 while a non-Indian perspective could highlight economic and technological restraints
in the early decades of the Indian program and U.S.-imposed restraints placed on planned
tests in 1982-83 and 1995, the key aspect of this discussion is that from the Indian
perspective, India has shown moral restraint in its nuclear weapons program for over half
a century.
325
"Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy." Paper laid on the table of the Lok Sabha on 27
May 1998 by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee.
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develop the nuclear option.326 Despite these strategic "fears," Prime Minister Shastri
authorized the pursuit of the nuclear option, but did not authorize the actual building of a
weapon. While this may seem to be a simple case of semantics, from the viewpoint of
Indian strategic culture and nonproliferation analysis, a nuclear option and a nuclear
weapon are two diametric concepts. One represents strength and the other represents
restrained strength. It was quite fitting, therefore, that when "India...moved from being
totally moralistic to being a little more realistic"327 and conducted the Pokhran II tests,
the operation would be codenamed "Operation ShaktF (Strength). The most recent step
up the ladder of Indian nuclear restraint was the release of India's draft "minimal
deterrent doctrine." If one were to project the next rung up the ladder, the signing of a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) or a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
would still allow India to develop its arsenal while restraining the size of the arsenal. As
India views most arms control treaties as discriminatory in nature, these treaty options
would only come to fruition if the original P-5 states also became signatories and ratified
the treaties.
Before projecting what step, or series of steps, India might take next in the
development of its nuclear arsenal, it is necessary to evaluate the strength of current
strategic, normative and political incentives for further proliferation. As the above
discussion highlighted, domestic politics have always been a necessary catalyst for any
326 Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security
Studies 2, no. 3&4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 201-202.
327 Jaswant Singh, 47.
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major progression in India's program. The obvious difficulty with basing a projection on
proliferation on the domestic politics of another country is that politics can be very
difficult to predict and, from a policy standpoint, the ability to influence domestic politics
within another country may be nearly nonexistent.
Despite this obstacle, certain trends in Indian politics can be tracked, especially in
light of recent Indian national elections. 328 Since the initial euphoria that swept India
following the Pokhran tests of 1998,329 domestic politics have returned to the normal
subjects of infrastructure improvements, overpopulation, insurgencies, illiteracy and
poverty. Unable to deliver in these key areas, the BJP lost a significant segment of its
voter base early in 1 999 and subsequently lost cohesion within the ruling coalition with a
resulting fall from political power. While serving as a caretaker and awaiting elections in
the fall, Prime Minister Vajpayee returned the nation's focus to the same issue that was
central to his election victory in 1998, nationalism based on Indian military strength. In
the three months leading up to the fall 1999 elections, three events signaled that the BJP
would indeed continue to use the nuclear issue as a tool in domestic politics.
The first was the BJP's use of the fighting in Kargil between Indian armed forces
and Islamic insurgents and Pakistani armed forces. The BJP successfully packaged the
328 These elections were especially crucial as the BJP is trying to reform the coalition
government that lost its majority votes and power in March 1999.
329 A poll taken two weeks after the Pokhran II test showed an 87% approval of the
testing and an 86% approval for weaponizing. See, "Solid Support," India Today (25
May 1998). Available on-line:<http://www.india-today.comyitoday/25051998/poll.html>.
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military operation as a "victory" for India.330 Adding to Indian nationalism was the
outrage caused by the torture and execution of captured Indian pilots and soldiers.331
Kargil also fueled the nuclear issue in India due to BJP claims that the fighting in
Kashmir validated the decision to go nuclear in 1998 since the overall threat of nuclear
retaliation prevented Pakistan from escalating the conflict. This last view has been
sharply contested by critics who hold that the Kargil crisis would not have even started
without Pakistan having been afforded strategic parity with India after testing its own
nuclear weapons in response to the Indian nuclear tests.332
The second recent signal of a BJP-driven resurgence of nuclear politics came in
August 1999 during several Independence Day speeches in which Prime Minister
Vajpayee and other BJP leaders declared that India would induct its new Agni U IRBM
330 An opinion poll taken at the beginning of August 1 999 showed that 8 1% of those
polled believed that Kargil was a "decisive victory for India." "BJP on Track for
Landslide Victory," Economic Times Online (14 August 1999). Available on-line:
<http://www.economictimes.com>.
331
"Indian pilot 'killed in cold blood."' BBC On-line (30 May 1999). Available on-line:
http://news.bbc.co.uk. Timothy D. Hoyt, "Conflict in Kargil," Southern Asian Internet
Forww(12June 1999).
332 W. P. Singh Sidhu, "Nuclearization of South Asia: The Kargil Experience," Presented
at the Eighth International Castiglioncello Conference. "Nuke Weaponisation Limited
Our Options in Kargil: Cong," The Hindustan Times Online (26 August 1999). Available
online: http://www.hindustantimes.com. P.R. Chari, "Kargil and BJP's Nuclear
Agenda," Nuclear & Disarmament Issues, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.
Article No.202(11 June 1999). Available Online: http//:www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/202-
ndi-chari.htm. Stephen P. Cohen, "India's Strategic Misstep," Nuclear & Disarmament
Issues, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Article No. 110 (08 June 1998).
Available online: http//:www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/ 1 10-ndi-cohen.htm.
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missile into the operational inventory.333 Coming one month before the commencement
of national elections, this declaration that India would pursue the deployment of a missile
that has been specifically advertised as a deterrent asset against China334 has again shown
the willingness of the BJP to utilize the "Chinese threat" as a tool in domestic politics.
The final example of the BJP's willingness to utilize India's nuclear weapons for
the garnering of votes can be seen in the decision to release the draft of India's nuclear
doctrine. Despite the fact that the draft had been approved for release for over two
months, the BJP-led government did not publish the document until weeks before the
commencement of national elections.335 What this incident and the Kargil and Agni II
examples have demonstrated is that the BJP, unable to resolve the true domestic concerns
of poverty, overpopulation and infrastructure bottlenecks, has continued to show a
willingness to engage in nuclear gestures to secure its political power base.
While domestic politics may be pushing India's nuclear program towards
expansion, the primary obstacles to the growth of India's nuclear program are financial
and technological. The greatest criticism of the draft nuclear doctrine is that it does not
333
"BJP, Allies Hope to Gain From the Kargil Victory," The Economic Times Online (16
August 1999). Available online: http://www.economictimes.com.
334
"Agni Described as 'Effective' Weapon Against PRC Missiles," The Pioneer in
English (12 Apr 99), 1. "Agni-II 'ready' to carry N-warhead," The Hindustan Times
Online (15 April 1999). Available online: http://wwww.hindustantimes.com.
335
"BJP plays nuclear politics on poll eve," Asian Age Online (18 August 1999).
Available online: http://www.asianage.com. "Opposition Sees a Design in Release of N-
doctrine," The Economic Times Online (18 August 1999). Available online:
htto://www.economictimes.com.
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specify the actual size of India's "minimal deterrent." The absence of size projections
and deployment timelines has led to greater ambiguity over how much India's nuclear
deterrent will cost. 336 What seems to be a common opinion is that the decision to pursue
a nuclear triad is not, from an economic viewpoint, "minimal."
One study projects a nuclear arsenal of 328 warheads with a nuclear triad and the
required command and control structure costing $14.2 billion over thirty years. The study
goes on to highlight an opportunity cost of over $48 billion due to "sanctions, lost
business, trade and investment,"337 bringing the total cost of the arsenal to approximately
$62 billion over a thirty year period (in 1998 prices). This equates to 2.38 percent of
India's GDP annually.338 Not included in this estimate, however, are the vast costs
associated with training personnel and deploying and maintaining equipment. According
336 Ninad D. Sheth, "Flaws Dog Nuclear Doctrine Draft," The Hindustan Times Online
(18 August 1999). Available online: http://www.hindustantimes.com. "Deterrence and
Debate," The Times of India (18 August 1999). Available online:
http://www.timesofmdia.com.
337 Bharat Karnad, "Going Thermonuclear: Why, With What Forces, At What Cost."
Journal of the United Service Institution of India 128, no. 533 (July-September 1998):
310-336. Kamard projects a force of 4 SSBNs, 70 SU-30MKIs and 25 ICBMs, 40
IRBMs, 25 tactical missiles, and 48 SLBMs.
338 Ibid. In India's 1999 military budget, 2.5 percent of its GDP was designated for its
conventional armed forces, which, by most accounts, were already severely under-funded.
See Sudha Passi, "Give Defence More Funds, say Experts." Economic Times Online (03
August 1999). Available online: http://www.economictimes.com. "Defence Budget as
Effective Regional CBM?" The Hindustan Times Online (1 March 1999). Available
online: http://hindustantimes.com. Mahendra Ved, "In Real terms, Defence Gets Less."
The Times ofIndia (28 February 1999). Available online: http://www.timesofindia.com.
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to one study, "building bombs consumed just seven percent of the total cost of the U.S.
nuclear weapons program."339
The lost opportunity costs associated with India's nuclear weapons program are
particularly difficult to predict, but also crucial to understand, in light of India's domestic
needs. Dr. Peter Lavoy, who is currently the Director of Counterproliferation Policy in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, cites one study which concludes that "a single
Agni missile costs as much as the annual operation of 13,000 health care centers."340
Additionally, numerous studies have shown that crucial foreign investments have dropped
in India due to loss of confidence in India's economic future. 341 While the BJP remains
adamant that sanctions and the costs associated with building a credible deterrent are only
short-term in nature, one can argue otherwise.
India's ability to develop a credible nuclear deterrent also centers on its ability to
produce, procure and maintain the delivery vehicles and warheads associated with a
"minimal deterrent." At the time of its tests in May 1998, India was believed to have
339 Peter R. Lavoy, "The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia." U.S. Information
Agency (September 1999). Available online: http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0999/
ijpe/pj291avo.htm.
340 Ibid.
341 Sharif Rangnekar, "US Investors Shun India, but S. Korea Keeps the Faith." The
Economic Times Online (15 September 1999). Available online:
http://www.economictimes.com. Subhash Mohanti, "India Promises but Delivers Little:
UK-based Agency." The Economic Times Online (4 September 1999). Available online:
http:www.economictimes.com). Peter R. Lavoy, "The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in
South Asia."
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twenty to thirty nuclear warheads in its arsenal.342 If Indian designs require five
kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per bomb, and India has an on-hand store of
approximately 400 kilograms and a production capacity of 20 kilograms (four bombs) of
weapons-grade plutonium a year,343 India can reach a level ofjust under 200 warheads by
2020.
The greatest obstacle to the deployment of a nuclear triad by India, however, lies
in the issue of delivery vehicles. While continuing to emphasize the need to develop self-
reliance in the procurement of its military hardware, India has been unable to surmount
many of the technological, bureaucratic and financial obstacles to self-sufficiency.
B. RUSSIA'S SUPPORT OF INDIAN EXPANSION
While India continues to invest in the development of its indigenous aviation,
naval and tank programs, notably the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and Arjun tank, it has
been forced to continue to rely upon imports to meet its requirements for modernization
of its conventional forces and the development of a nuclear triad. For strike aircraft, India
is acquiring forty SU-30MKIs aircraft, plus IL-78 refuelers and IL-76 airborne early
warning aircraft for strike support. 344 Additionally the purchase of four Russian TU-
342 David Albright, "The Shots Heard Round the World." The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 4, no. 4 (July/August 1998). Available on-line: <http://www.bullatomsci.org/
issues/ 98/a98albright.html>.
343 Ibid., page 8 of 9.
344 Thomas W. Zarzecki, "Arming China or Arming India: Future Russian Dilemmas."
Comparative Strategy' 18 (August 1999): 262-265.
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22Ms strike aircraft and 16 to 18 French 2000 D Mirage fighter aircraft "soft wired for
carrying nuclear missiles" is also being negotiated. 345 To compensate for the high cost
associated with the direct purchase of these systems, Russia has even offered to "lease"
IL-76s and Tu-22s to India.346
The most controversial area, however, where India is reported to be receiving
military assistance is in the development of its "indigenous" nuclear-powered submarine
and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). India's Advanced Technological
Vessel (ATV) program dates back to 1988 when India leased a Soviet Charlie-I Class
SSN for three years.347 The knowledge shared and relationships established with the
Soviet Navy during this period are reported to continue today as India struggles with the
design of its propulsion plant and the installation of the reactor in the submarine hull. 348
Additional reports indicate that the hull design and reactor design of the two unfinished
ATVs are based on the new Russian Project 885 Severodvinsk Class and its 190MW
345
"Russia May Sell Four Bombers To India." Agence France Presse (27 August 1999).
Rahul Bedi, "Delhi Plans Purchase of French Mirage 2000, Other Arms." The Asian Age
(29 Aug 99): 1-2.
346
"Russia Offers Leasing of Military Hardware to India," The Hindustan Times (07
October 1999).
347 Dmitry Litovkin, "Indian Nuclear Submarine Fleet Development Program: Russian
Participation," Yaderny Kontrol, no. 10 (Spring 1999): 48.
348 Mark Gorwitz, "The Indian Strategic Nuclear Submarine Project: An Open Literature
Analysis." (December 1996). Available online: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/
sub/ssn/partO 1 .htm
115
pressurized water reactor. 349 Additionally, the former "apprentices" of the Indian Navy
during the three-year period of the submarine lease "have taken key posts in Indian design
offices developing nuclear submarines."350 Finally, an entire Indian submarine crew is
reported to have spent at least six months during 1999 "on an official mission" in the
closed northern Russian city of Severodvinsk.351
The U.S. Department of State reported during 1998 that Russia was helping India
develop the "Sagarika," a submarine-launched ballistic missile.352 The Sagarika has
caused Indian scientists difficulty, especially with its guidance systems, and many foreign
observers state that the system is a "far cry" from being operational.353 Again, Russian
scientists are reported to be supporting this "indigenous" project. 354
While the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes is in violation of
numerous international treaties, it is difficult to determine whether "Russian support" of
349 Sergey Golotyuk, "Nuclear Cooperation Between Moscow and Delhi: No One is Any
The Wiser." Moscow Russkiy Telegraph (1 July 1998): 1. Available on FBIS: Document
ID: FTS19980701001186. Igor Kudrik, "Russia Helps India Build Nuclear Submarine."
Available from Bellona: <http.7/www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news/990324.htm>.
350 Dmitry Litovkin, 48.
351 Sergey Golotyuk, 1.
352 Steven Lee Myers, "Russia is Helping India Extend Range of Missiles, U.S. Aides
Say," The New York Times (27 April 1998): Al. Some news reports have also referred to
this system as a submarine-launched cruise missile. Its range is reported to be 250-350
km.
353 Dmitry Litovkin, 46.
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the ATV and Sagarika projects is state-sponsored or a product of individual scientists left
unemployed and unaccounted for after the collapse of the Soviet Union. "No one knows
where all the weapons scientists have gone."355 However, if one considers the role of
Russian interest groups in influencing Russian policy decisions, it is worth noting that the
Rubin design bureau of St. Petersburg, one of Russia's two major submarine design
bureaus, designed and developed the Severodvinsk-class submarine.
C. AREA DENIAL AND THE INDIAN "THREAT"
The current inability of the United States to exert successful unilateral diplomatic
or economic pressure on India highlights a pattern of waning U.S. prestige and diplomatic
power since the end of the Cold War. 356 Because America is unable to achieve its ends
through economic and diplomatic means alone, some Indian observers have speculated,
the United States may decide to utilize "the military option" to influence India during
future regional crises. Reviving Indian images of the U.S.S. Enterprise in 1971, this U.S.
military "influence" would most likely be naval in nature and would entail power
354 Srinjoy Chowdhury, "Work on Indian Missile Program Reported." The Telegraph (14
Apr 98); 6. "US misses target, say Congressmen on Ghauri." The Hindu (May 6,1998).
N.C. Menon, "Subtleties of Sagarika." The Hindu (1 1 May 1998).
355 David Hoffman, "Idled Russian Arms Experts Find Takers For Their Nuclear Know-
How," International Herald Tribune (29 December 1998): 7.
356 Chintamani Mahapatra, "Pokhran II and After: Dark Clouds Over Indo-US Relations,"
Strategic Analysis vol. 22, no. 5 (August 1998). Available online: <http://www.idsa-
india.org/an-aug8-3.html> [6 January 1999].
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projection. From the viewpoint of Indian analysts, the United States is already preparing
for this inevitability by conducting war-game simulations of such a scenario.357
To counter American intervention, India's military establishment has advocated
the procurement of "sea-denial assets," such as the ATV project.358 "The Indian Navy
would need to possess the ability to raise the costs of American military and naval
intervention against India...The development of even limited 'sea denial' capabilities
against US military forces at sea could assist an attempt to deter an attack of this nature in
the first place."359 Since it is unlikely that the Indian government would attempt to
engage the United States in a full-blown war, India's strategy would center on making the
cost of any U.S. intervention too high. As an internal Indian Navy study, dated one week
after the Pokhran II tests, states: "Should it be possible for the target nation to be able to
retaliate to cause significant losses, casualties or embarrassment, the strategy of
intervention is not normally resorted to."360 While the possibility of a direct military
confrontation between India and the United States may seem remote, this possibility has
evidently been considered in New Delhi.
357 W. P. Singh Sindu, 20-21.
358 Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of India," 362, footnote 105. Vice
Admiral S. P. Govil (Retd), "Indian Navy - Its Shape and Size," Indian Defense Review,
1997.
359 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "US Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean," Strategic Analysis
vol. 22, no. 9 (December 1998). Available online: <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-dec8-
4.html> [6 January 1999].
360 Cited in Ibid. Emphasis added.
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D. POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Neither country
has real-time surveillance capability; reliable command, control and
communications; or early warning systems. This vulnerability could lead
to a launch on warning posture, further aggravating the subcontinent's
already serious instability. Moreover, this rivalry increases the possibility
of Chinese and Russian involvement and more explicit missile and nuclear
assistance. 361
-The Deutsch Report, 1999
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 awoke the world to
the reality that the spread of nuclear weapons had reached a dangerous
new phase. Two regional powers with unresolved antagonisms had made
their nuclear ambitions overt. The tests reflected the failure of global non-
proliferation norms to prevail over regional security imperatives, and
increased fears that regional conflicts could turn into real nuclear wars.362
-The Tokyo Forum, 1999
Having reviewed the historical motivations for nuclear proliferation in India and
the current prospects for India to continue to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities,
policy options for the United States must be discussed. Pokhran II has taught the United
States several lessons concerning its nonproliferation policies that can be applied in South
Asia and, to some extent, globally. While some observers cite the inability of the United
States to prevent India's overt testing in May 1998 as a failure in American efforts, the
analysis in this thesis of India's strategic culture suggests that India's decision to test was
361 Combating the Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction. "The Deutsch Report."
(14 July 1999), 15.
362
"Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21 st Century," The Report of the
Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (25 July 1999): 10.
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driven primarily by domestic politics, and was therefore beyond the reach of American
nonproliferation efforts.
The ability of the United States to rollback and eliminate India's nuclear arsenal
hinges on the willingness of the other P-5 states to pursue this objective,363 and this is
unlikely in the foreseeable future. As early as 1965, a National Security Council report to
President Johnson noted that "lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet
Union on nuclear weapons and agreements on broader arms control measures must be
recognized as important components on the overall program to prevent nuclear
proliferation."364 The statement by Brahma Chellaney, quoted in the beginning of this
chapter, expresses the Indian belief that nuclear weapons remain a symbol of global
power. If the United States and the other members of the P-5 opt to retain nuclear
weapons, Indians argue, they cannot realistically expect India to abandon its arsenal; and
they should therefore abandon such foreign policy goals.
Additional South Asian foreign policy objectives of the United States that require
review are the goals of obtaining accession to the CTBT and the projected FMCT by
India and Pakistan and a bilateral no-first-use agreement. Until the United States Senate
ratifies the CTBT, or another treaty regime with significant testing restrictions, India's
363 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 455-56.
364
"a Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation," Secret (21
January 1965): 5. Digital National Security Archives, Non-Proliferation Collection. Item
Number: NPO 1104.
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leadership will continue to view its stance on the treaty as "vindicated."365 Pakistan in
turn has linked its accession to the CTBT with India's; and Islamabad also appears
unlikely to adhere to the projected FMCT due to a perception of strategic inferiority, in
view of India's superior air force and air defense systems.366 Moreover, the likelihood of
securing a Pakistani promise for no-first-use of nuclear weapons is minimal as this
strategic inferiority feeds Pakistan's sense of vulnerability.
American foreign policy in South Asia should recognize that India and Pakistan
will expand their nuclear arsenals. It is incumbent upon the United States to ensure that
said expansion is conducted in a limited and safe manner. The concerns highlighted
above by the Deutsch Report and the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament are real. While both India and Pakistan claim that their nuclear arsenals are
stable and safe due to their limited size, factors other than "size" can trigger nuclear
release. 367 Included in these factors are the lacunae of "real-time surveillance capability;
reliable command, control and communications; or early warning systems."368
365
"Senate Debate on CTBT Vindicates India's Stand," The Hindustan Times (15
October 1999).
366 This sense of inferiority has only been escalated by the recent negotiations between
India and Russia for the sale of Tu-22 strike-bombers and S-300V air defense systems.
See Aroosa Alam, "India to Acquire Capability to Counter Pakistani Missiles," Pakistan
Observer (29 June 1999): 1.
367 Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia. Adelphi Paper 312 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
368 Combating the Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction. "The Deutsch Report."
(14 July 1999), 15.
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According to some interpretations of the NPT, the United States cannot provide
India and Pakistan with nuclear-related command and control systems.369 However,
transparency can be created with the sharing of American-provided intelligence and
monitoring data with both states.370 The possibility of a border conflict escalating into a
nuclear exchange should be weighed against the limited real-time intelligence capabilities
of both states. During the Kargil crisis of 1999, a recurring complaint was that India's
satellites and airborne reconnaissance assets did not provide adequate early-warning and
imagery quality. 371 A Pakistani P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft was shot down during
the waning days of the conflict while it performed a reconnaissance mission.372 Lacking
369 An AP report in December 1998 stated that the United States did in fact provide a tour
of an American command and control facility to a visiting Indian delegation. See Donna
Bryson, "U.S. Tacitly Accepts India's Need For a Nuclear Deterrence," (17 December
1998).
370 India and Pakistan, however, would have to gain confidence in the reliability of
American-supplied data, and the U.S. government may prove reluctant to compromise
intelligence collection capabilities. Conversation with George Perkovich, 18 November
1999. Any sharing of American satellite imagery should also be weighed against the
recent case of Iraq taking shared American imagery acquired during the Iran-Iraq War and
using it to analyze and counter the ability of the United States to detect Iraq's nuclear
weapons program. See Richard Kokoski, Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 221-22.
371 Chandan Nandy, "Kargil Panel Quizzes Ex-RAW Chief," The Telegraph (28 OCT
99). "ISRO Plans Satellite with Surveillance Capability," The Economic Times Online
(02 August 1999).
372 Indrani Bagchi, "India Guns Down Pak Aircraft Near Kutch Border," The Economic
Times Online ( 1 1 August 1 999).
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the technical capability for transparency during regional conflicts, India and Pakistan may
fall victim to misperceptions.373
The benefit of American-provided technical transparency is it would take the
orchestration of confidence-building measures out of the hands of India and Pakistan and
direct it equitably to both states. While this may appear to be a case of American
intervention in the internal matters of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan both proved
willing to accept American-supplied intelligence as a de-escalatory mechanism during the
1990 Kashmir crisis.374 Left to their own devices, India and Pakistan have not
historically taken confidence-building measures seriously enough. Providing the rhetoric
but not the action, neither state's leadership has viewed CBMs for what they are:
potentially useful instruments of national security, at least in some circumstances. 375
Additionally, the United States should actively educate India and Pakistan about
the vast hidden costs associated with deploying and maintaining a nuclear triad.376 While
such information may not sway deployment decisions, a foundation of nuclear knowledge
can influence the deployment levels selected.
373 Mario E. Carranza, 18.
374 Sumit Ganguly, NPS presentation.
375 The process of injecting American-proposed CBMs into the subcontinent, albeit
delicate, can be performed if the United States addresses Indian sensitivities by conferring
with New Delhi first at each stage of the process. Additionally, Pakistani compliance
must not be secured via the habitual American method (a promise of arms sales) as this
would cause a loss of Indian support. Conversation with George Perkovich, 18
November 1999.
376 Peter Lavoy, 205.
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Another area of potential U.S. engagement in India concerns its vulnerable and
crucial domestic economy and infrastructure projects. Measures to encourage U.S.
investment in India will not only improve diplomatic ties between the countries, but will
also greatly reduce anti-American sentiment among the Indian populace.377 Additionally,
the arena ofjoint oil exploration projects holds promise:378 "By the early part of the next
century, India would become the third largest consumer of petroleum products in the
world, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia."379 In 1996-97, India
imported approximately fifty percent of its crude oil demand, and by 2010, this import-to-
domestic-demand percentage is expected to increase to seventy-three percent.380
Finally, the United States must address the role of Russia in South Asia. While
there is no reason to recreate the Cold War competition, the willingness of Russia to
undermine U.S. nonproliferation and security policies in South Asia raises serious
questions. The difficulty arises, however, when American policy must cater to and "buy-
out" Russian interest groups. While the United States may have been successful in such
377 One of the high points of American popularity in India during the Cold War was
during the shipments of grain relief in the 1960s.
378 Russia is already conducting joint oil exploration ventures with India. See
Madhumita Chakraborty, "India's ONGC to Explore Oil In Caspian Sea," Delhi
Financial Express (4 January 1999); and Atul Aneja, "India, Russia to Tap Oil In Iraq,"
The Hindu (23 December 1998).
379 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "An Energy Security Policy for India: The Case of Oil and
Natural Gas," Strategic Analysis 21, no. 1 1 (February 1998): 1675. This representation of
the situation appears to omit U.S. consumption of petroleum products.
380 Ibid., 1676.
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an endeavor with the cryogenic engine deal, the recent failure to block the sale of two
light-water reactors to India shows the limits of American diplomatic and financial
weight. The United States does, however, continue to hold considerable influence in the
World Bank and the IMF and can affect investor confidence in Russia through these
institutions.
The history of Indo-Russian military cooperation provides a foundation for
understanding the current rift in Indo-American relations and the ability and willingness
of India to defy American nonproliferation goals. Moreover, Indian strategic culture
highlights the likely course of military and nuclear expansion in India and how said
course may cross the path of American forces and interests. While India is not a rogue
state, future policy and doctrinal decisions by its leadership could result in the first
bilateral nuclear exchange in history (with Pakistan or China) or lead to direct conflict
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